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Stealing from Thieves: 
 
Firm Governance and Performance when States are 
Predatory 
 
Art Durnev and Larry Fauver 
 
Abstract 
We investigate how predatory government policies (expropriation, lack of property rights 
protection, corruption, crime) interact with managerial incentives in shaping firm governance 
structure.  Our  model  shows  that  owners  have  lower  incentives  to  encourage  value-
maximization by managers if the government is likely to expropriate firm profits. This result 
emerges because it is more difficult for governments to seize firm profits that managers have 
already stolen and hidden from the owners. The model also demonstrates that the positive 
valuation  effect  of  stronger  firm  governance  is  lower  in  states  with  more  predatory 
governments. We test these predictions using several distinct data sets on firm governance 
and  disclosure  practices,  and  the  business  and  financing  obstacles  firms  face  due  to 
government intervention. The empirical results are consistent with the model’s predictions. 
Specifically, we find that firms located in countries with more predatory governments practice 
weaker  governance  and  disclose  less  information.  Further,  the  previously  documented 
positive  relation between  firm  governance  and firm  performance  is weaker  or  disappears 
altogether  when  governments  pursue  predatory  policies.  Finally,  in  countries  with  more 
predatory governments, firm-specific characteristics are less important in explaining variation 
in governance and firms have more similar governance structures. 
 
   1 
"Even those companies that are well run and are making a lot of money don't wish to audit themselves in keeping 
with international accounting principles because if they do the government will take what they are making away.” 
 
Black and Kraakman (1996) quoting investment banker Boris Jordan in Moscow (Russia) 
 
The  progressive  globalization  of  capital  and  product  markets  has  put  pressure  on 
companies to practice better governance, regardless of their location on the world map. Recent 
studies show that good governance (whether imposed by laws or implemented on an elective 
basis) yields higher returns for shareholders, making the effort of improving governance worth 
the cost (see, for example, La Porta et al. (2002); Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003); Gompers, 
Ishi, and Metrick (2003); Klapper and Love (2004); Durnev and Kim (2005); Black, Jang, and Kim 
(2006a); Aggarwal et al. (2007); Chhaochharia and Laeven (2007)).  
Despite  the  growing  evidence  on  the  value-enhancing  effects  of  better  governance,  the 
question  of  how  government  policies  towards  private  businesses  interact  with  managerial 
incentives in shaping firm governance remains mostly unexplored. The few notable exceptions 
are the papers by Desai and Dharmapala (2004) and Desai, Dyck, and Zingales (2006), which 
examine the effects of firms’ tax evasion strategies and the enforcement of the tax code on 
valuation and governance, and Stulz (2005), who develops a model of managerial diversion 
when state expropriate firms’ profits.   
The conventional governance models (see, for example, Friedman et al. (2000) and Shleifer 
and Wolfenzon (2002)) assume that two main players shape a firm’s governance policy: self-
dealing  managers  and minority investors.  The  notion  that  governments  themselves  play  an 
important  role  by  affecting  the  cash  flow  distribution  between  minority  investors  and 
controlling shareholders has been largely ignored. This paper extends research in this area by 
recognizing  that  firms  often  operate  in  countries  in  which  state  rulers  are  authoritarian, 
interfering with firms’ affairs through the solicitation of bribes, overregulation, a disregard of 
property rights, confiscatory taxation, and outright expropriation of firm assets.1 
Specifically, in this paper we build a theoretical model of governance in the presence of 
predatory governments and empirically examine the following questions: 
•  How  do  government  policies  towards  private  businesses  enhance  or  obstruct  firms’ 
incentives to practice good governance and increase transparency?  
•  How does the relation between firm governance and performance change if one takes into 
consideration obstacles imposed by governments?  
                                                 
1 State interference is not only present in developing countries but also in developed ones. Roe (2003) and 
Gourevitch  and  Shinn  (2006)  discuss  how  firms  alter  their  governance  structures  in  response  to 
intervention from states and unions in Western European countries.   2 
•  What firm and industry characteristics explain firms’ governance choices in countries where 
regulators pursue predatory policies? 
We consider a “twin-agency problem” model similar to Stulz (2005) wherein both states and 
managers can divert resources from a company. Taking into account the incentives of each, the 
company  owners  set  up  a  governance  structure  that  depends  on  exogenous  parameters: 
shareholder  protection  laws  and  the  degree  of  state  predation.  Our  model  solves  for  the 
equilibrium  levels  of  government  expropriation,  managerial  diversion,  firm  governance 
structure, and firm valuation.  
The model predicts that when the risk of government expropriation exists, owners establish 
a  firm  governance  structure  that  provides  incentives  for  managers  to  deviate  from  profit 
maximization. Intuitively, managers have greater incentives to divert firm income when the 
likelihood of expropriation by the government is larger. This result emerges because it is more 
difficult for governments to seize firm profits that managers have already stolen and hidden 
from the owners. Thus, diversion by managers complements expropriation by the states. The 
owners consent to managerial diversion because a greater amount would otherwise be seized 
by the governments. For example, firm owners may prefer managerial diversion to government 
expropriation if it is easier for the governments to expropriate a fixed fraction of profits from 
larger  or  more  profitable  companies.2  Thus,  if  the  risk  of  government  expropriation  is 
sufficiently high, firm owners benefit from distorting managerial incentives from pure value-
maximization by implementing a weak governance structure. Accordingly, we predict that, all 
else  equal,  firms  located  in  countries with  predatory  governments  have  lower  incentives  to 
practice good governance and increase transparency. 
A  number  of  papers  explore  the  valuation  effect  of  sound  governance  practices  (for 
example, Black, Jang, and Kim (2006a); Aggarwal et al. (2007); see Denis and McConnell 2003 
for a comprehensive list). These papers mostly document a positive monotonic relation between 
firm  governance  and  valuation.  Other  authors  (Klapper  and  Love  (2004);  Durnev  and  Kim 
(2005); Bruno and Claessens (2007); Chhaochharia and Laeven (2007)) argue that, with regard to 
firm valuation, sound firm governance can partially compensate for deficiencies in investor 
protection laws. In this paper, we examine how state policies toward private businesses affect 
                                                 
2  Black  and  Kraakman  (1996)  presents  the  following  anecdotal  evidence:  “[In  Russia,]  the  supposedly 
confidential financial statements required by the tax laws, once given to the government, are often delivered to the 
mafia by corrupt officials. In this environment, investors do not even want the companies in which they invest to 
report  profits  honestly.  The  risk  that  managers  will  steal  hidden  profits  is  preferable  to  the  certainty  that  the 
government or the mafia will take even more after honest disclosure.” 
   3 
the  conventional  firm  governance-performance  relation.  According  to  our  model,  investors 
place a valuation discount on firm governance in the presence of government expropriation. 
Thus, the positive valuation effect of stronger firm governance is predicted to be weaker in 
states with more predatory governments.  
Some  progress  has  been  made  in  understanding  firms’  choice  of  governance  structures. 
Using  a  sample  of  governance  provisions  for  U.S.  firms,  Gillan,  Hartzell,  and  Starks  (2005) 
present evidence that corporate governance structures are endogenous responses to the costs 
and benefits that firms face. They identify several firm and industry characteristics that explain 
the choice of governance: investment opportunities, product uniqueness, degree of competition, 
informational environment, and leverage. In an international setting, firms with more profitable 
investment  opportunities  and  greater  need  for  external  financing  are  shown  to  have  better 
governance and transparency (Durnev and Kim (2005); Black, Jung, and Kim (2006b); Anand, 
Milne, and Purda (2007)). However, Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2006) indicate that in countries 
with underdeveloped financial markets, firm governance is mainly explained by country rather 
than firm characteristics. We provide an additional rationale for firm and industry factors to 
play a lesser role in explaining variation in firm governance practices in developing countries. 
Specifically, firm-specific drivers to improve governance are less important when firms operate 
in environments characterized by heavy state interference. Thus, all else equal, firm governance 
structures are expected to be more similar in countries with more predatory governments. 
We test the model’s predictions using four comprehensive data sets covering more than 80 
countries  on  international  firm  governance,  transparency,  and  the  business  and  financing 
obstacles governments impose: Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia’s (CLSA) 2000-2001 Governance 
Indicators, S&P’s 1997-2002 Transparency Rankings, Institutional Shareholder Service’s 2003-2006 
International  Corporate  Governance  Quotients,  and  the  World  Bank’s  2000  World  Business 
Environment Survey. While these data sets have been used in previous research (see Klapper and 
Love (2004); Ayyagagri, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005, 2006); Durnev and Kim (2005); 
Aggarwal and Williams (2006); Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2006); Doidge, Karolyi, 
and  Stulz  (2006);  Khanna,  Kogan,  and  Palepu  (2006);  Aggarwal  et  al.  (2007);  Bruno  and 
Claessens (2007); Chhaochharia and Laeven (2007)), to the best of our knowledge we are the 
first to explore them in a unified setting. The panel structure of some of the data sets also helps 
us address the endogeneity problem that often plagues conventional governance studies.  
The empirical results are consistent with the model’s predictions. In particular, we find 
that firms located in countries with more predatory governments practice weaker governance   4 
and  disclose  less  information.  Furthermore,  the  previously  documented  positive  relation 
between  firm  governance  and  firm  performance  is  weaker  or  disappears  altogether when 
governments  pursue  predatory  policies.  In  addition,  we  observe  that  firm-specific 
characteristics are less important in explaining the variation in governance structures. Finally, 
we show that firms’ governance structures share greater similarities in countries with more 
predatory  governments.  Our  results  appear  to  be  robust  across  the  four  data  sets. 
Furthermore,  our  findings  survive  a  battery  of  robustness  checks  relating  to  endogeneity, 
errors-in-variables, sample selection, additional control variables, and alternative definitions 
of the main variables.3  
Improving governance standards is vital for establishing and maintaining well-functioning 
capital markets. Our findings together suggest that governments that pursue predatory policies 
aggravate firm governance problems. The policy implications of this result are twofold.  First, 
when  government  capture  is  high,  strengthening  securities  laws  may  not  improve  firm 
governance unless regulators ensure concomitant improvements in the quality of government 
policies. Second, countries that do not protect private businesses from government predation 
but lobby extensively for stricter securities laws should first ensure better protection of private 
property rights. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section I provides a literature review. We provide a 
case  study  of  government  predation  in  Section  II.  The  model  is  presented  in  Section  III. 
Section IV describes our data and variables, and Section V presents empirical results. Section 
VI discusses the robustness of our findings. Finally, Section VII concludes. 
 
I. Literature Review 
Conventional governance models (for example, LaPorta et al. (2002); Shleifer and Wolfenzon 
(2002))  consider  managers  that  divert  resources  from  minority  shareholders.  These  papers 
generally conclude that stronger investor protection reduces diversion and leads to higher firm 
valuation and better-developed financial markets.  
Several papers incorporate a regulator into a traditional manager-shareholder model and 
examine how managerial incentives change when companies avoid taxes through various tax 
sheltering schemes. In these papers, tax sheltering and diversion from minority shareholders 
                                                 
3 In a separate project, we examine how companies can protect themselves from predatory government 
policies  by  becoming  more  indispensable  to  the  states  through  altering  their  capital  structure,  asset 
composition (tangible vs. intangible assets), employment policies, and degree of international exposure. 
Section VI discusses these issues in more detail.   5 
are viewed as complements because it is easier to divert resources from income that is already 
hidden from the tax authorities. Specifically, Desai, Dyck, and Zingales (2006) show that stricter 
tax enforcement improves firm governance because enforcement involves the verification of 
financial  statements’  numbers.  Desai  and  Dharmapala  (2004,  2006)  investigate  how  firm 
governance interacts with firm incentives to use tax shelters and the impact of tax sheltering on 
firm  valuation.  In  their  models,  sheltering  raises  shareholder  wealth  for  firms  with  strong 
governance. Stulz (2006) refers to the complementary relation between managerial diversion 
and  state  expropriation  the  “twin-agency  problem”  and  discusses  how  state  quality  affects 
investment strategies and corporate ownership.  
Although  these  models  share  one  feature  that  is  similar  with  ours,  namely,  the 
complementary  relation  between  state  expropriation  and  managerial  diversion,  the  model 
developed in this paper differs because firm governance structure is viewed as the outcome of 
government  interference.  Moreover,  the  aforementioned  papers  do  not  investigate  how  the 
relation between governance and valuation changes under government predation. 
A number of papers examine why private businesses move “underground,” considering the 
effects of a mafia presence, corruption, and discretionary taxation policies. Johnson, Kaufmann, 
and Zoido-Lobaton (1998) and Friedman et al. (2000) argue that it is corruption and not just 
higher  tax  rates  that  drive  businesses  underground.  Indeed,  they  argue  that  entrepreneurs 
operate underground not to avoid official taxes but to reduce the burden of bureaucracy and 
corruption. Alexeev, Janeba, and Osborne (2004) examine the trade-offs of paying taxes and 
relying on government protection compared to running business unofficially and seeking mafia 
defense.  
The direct effects of corruption on economic development are tested in Mauro (1995), who 
finds that corruption leads to lower investment and in turn lower economic growth. Lee and Ng 
(2006)  investigate  how  corruption  affects  corporate  valuations  and  find  that  firms  in  more 
corrupt countries trade at a discount because of higher required rates of return on equity.  
Cheung et al. (2007) analyze connected transactions between Chinese publicly listed-firms 
and state-owned enterprises. They document significant expropriation of resources from these 
firms by local governments. 
Our paper is also related to the emerging literature on the presence and value of political 
connections. Fisman (2001) examines how political ties of Indonesian companies affect their 
stock prices. He documents that Indonesian firms close to Suharto (Indonesia’s authoritarian 
president from 1967 to 1998) lost more value in response to allegations of corruption within   6 
Suharto’s government and also with Suharto’s health problems. Rajan and Zingales (2003) show 
that  incumbent  companies  can  use  laws  and  regulations  to  their  advantage  by  hindering 
financial development that would otherwise benefit young companies. Faccio (2005) examines 
the  value  of  political  loyalty  and  finds  a  positive  valuation  effect  when  corporate  directors 
belong  to  ruling  parties.  Faccio,  Masulis,  and  McConnell  (2005)  document  that  politically 
connected firms are more likely to be bailed out during financial distress. Leuz and Oberholzer 
(2006) study the role of political ties for firms' financing strategies and their long-run financial 
performance. They find that firms with political connections are less likely to rely on publicly 
traded securities. Boubarki, Cosset, and Saffar (2006) and Bertrand et al. (2006) investigate the 
origins  of  political  ties  and  argue  that  privatized  firms  with  greater  government  residual 
ownership are more likely to become politically loyal.  
 
II. A Case of Predation: YUKOS 
To illustrate the impact of government predation, we provide a case study of the Russian oil 
firm YUKOS. The story of YUKOS received a lot of attention in popular business sources such 
as the Economist, Financial Times, New York Times, and Wall Street Journal, as well as in a number 
of academic papers (see, for instance, Goriaev and Sonin (2005)).  
YUKOS  was  a  highly  profitable  petroleum  company  in  Russia  that,  until  recently,  was 
controlled by former Russian billionaire Mikhail Khodorkovsky. YUKOS was one of the world's 
largest non-state oil companies, producing 20% of Russian oil and accounting for 2% of the 
world’s  production.  Its  assets  were  acquired  by  controversial  means  from  the  Russian 
government during the privatization process of the early 1990s.  
In the 1990s, YUKOS’ governance, like that of most other large Russian companies, was very 
weak by international standard, and Black, Kraakman, and Tarassova (2000) document multiple 
shareholder abuses by YUKOS following the 1998 Russian economic crisis. Since 1999, however, 
YUKOS has jumped ahead of other large Russian companies in developing new standards of 
corporate  governance  and  transparency.  In  fact,  YUKOS  was  the  first  Russian  company  to 
report  according  to  the  international  accounting  standards.  Between  1998  and  2003,  the 
company  experienced  a  tenfold  growth  in  assets  and  market  capitalization  and  was 
continuously  praised  by  many  ratings  agencies  for  its  sound  governance  and  disclosure 
practices. 
During the 2003 political dispute between the Russian government and YUKOS’ largest 
shareholder, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, a number of law enforcement and government regulatory   7 
agencies took many predatory actions against the company. Coordinated attacks were directed 
toward YUKOS’ core shareholders in the media. On December 2, 2003, the Ministry of Taxation 
alleged  that  YUKOS  concealed  at  least  the  equivalent  of  5  billion  U.S.  dollars  in  taxes.  A 
corporate presentation of YUKOS from December 2004 showed that the total tax burden for 
2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003 was 67%, 105%, 111%, and 83% of the company's declared revenue. 
According to a resolution of the Council of Europe, 
"Intimidating  action  by  different  law  enforcement  agencies  against  YUKOS  and  its 
business partners and other institutions linked to Mr. Khodorkovsky and his associates 
and the careful preparation of this action in terms of public relations, taken together, give 
a picture of a co-coordinated attack by the state…The circumstances of the sale by auction 
of Yuganskneftegaz [a subsidiary of YUKOS] to ‘Baikal Finance Group’ and the swift 
takeover  of  the  latter  by  state-owned  Rosneft  raises  additional  issues  related  to  the 
protection  of  property…YUKOS  was  forced  to  sell  off  its  principal  asset,  by  way  of 
trumped-up  tax  reassessments  leading  to  a  total  tax  burden  far  exceeding  that  of 
YUKOS’ competitors, and for 2002 even exceeding YUKOS’ total revenue for that year." 
The subsequent grim events against YUKOS included the seizure of YUKOS’ assets, the 
arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, and ultimately, Khodorkovsky’s detention in a Siberian prison 
camp.4  Using  questionable  techniques,  the  remaining  assets  of  the  once  transparent  and 
profitable company were auctioned off to politically loyal state companies.  
Goriaev and Sonin (2005) document that investors perceived the attacks on YUKOS as a 
strong  signal  that  the  state  would  expropriate  from  other  companies  through  arbitrary  tax 
enforcement. Goriaev and Sonin (2005) show further that the impact of the attacks on YUKOS 
on other firms’ performance depended on the companies’ ownership structure (state or private) 
and  level  of  transparency.  For  example,  the  price  reaction  was  more  negative  for  more 
transparent companies than for less transparent ones. Presumably, investors expected greater 
government intervention in transparent companies, as it would be easier to extract rents from 
such companies. 
 
III. Model and Predictions 
Using a simple framework, we show that the predictions of a standard governance-firm 
valuation model (Johnson et al. (2000); LaPorta et al. (2002); Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2003)) 
                                                 
4 On February 5 of 2007, new charges of embezzlement and money laundering were brought against 
Khodorkovsky, just months before he was to become eligible for parole, and one year before the next 
Russian presidential election.   8 
change if we integrate a predatory government into the model. The intuition behind some of 
our results is similar to that in Stulz (2006), who calls the complementary relation between 
managerial diversion and state expropriation the “twin-agency problem.” Moreover, our model 
shares common features with taxation and governance models presented in Friedman et al. 
(2000), Desai and Dharmapala (2004, 2006), and Desai, Dyck, and Zingales (2006). Note that we 
acknowledge the existence of other mechanisms that may lead to our predictions; we discuss 
such mechanisms later in this section.  
 
A. Setup 
We  consider  an  economy  with  a  single  representative  firm  and  a  state.  There  are  four 
periods 0, 1, 2, and 3. In period 0, the owner of the firm hires a risk-neutral manager and offers 
her a linear compensation contract gV, where V is firm value. Parameter g represents the quality 
of the firm’s corporate governance, where quality of corporate governance is defined as the 
degree to which the manager’s incentives are aligned with firm value maximization. It can be 
viewed  as  Desai  and  Dharmapala’s  (2004)  “high-powered  incentives,”  that  is,  incentives 
provided by means of a compensation contract or managerial ownership.5    
In period 0, the risk-neutral owner controls 100% of the company and chooses the level of g 
that maximizes expected firm value.6 In period 1, a cash flow of 1 is realized. In period 2, the 
manager  diverts  a  fraction  of  cash  flow  equal  to  d,  and  the  government  simultaneously 
expropriates fraction m from the post-diversion value (1 – d).7 In period 3, the firm is liquidated 
and the owner receives the liquidating dividends. Figure 1 summarizes the timing of the model. 
 




                                                 
5 The model generates similar predictions using alternative definitions of corporate governance (see the 
end of this section).   
6 In general, managerial compensation is a linear function of gV, A + B(gV), where A and B are constants 
(B > 0). Since the manager is risk-neutral, the values of A and B become irrelevant and the manager 
maximizes gV. The owner maximizes firm value minus the managerial opportunity cost ω (compensation 
the  manager  would  receive  working  elsewhere).  This  is  equivalent  to  the  owner’s  firm  value 
maximization because the owner can promise the compensation parameter A that sets A + B(gV) equal to 
the opportunity cost ω. Fershtman and Judd (1987) provide a detailed discussion of these considerations.  
7 The results remain unchanged if the state expropriates before or after managerial diversion. 
Period 1: 
A cash flow of 1 
is realized. 
Period 2: 
Manager diverts fraction d of 
cash flow. 
Government expropriates 
fraction m of cash flow. 




structure g is 
established.   9 
 
Managers divert the fraction d of revenue that is not shared with the owner or the state.  
Diversion is costly, with the cost being equal to cd2/2. Parameter c is larger in countries with 
stricter  anti-diversion  laws  (better  investor  protection  laws).8  The  manager’s  objective  is  to 
maximize her total wealth, which consists of the amount of funds diverted d plus governance-
enhanced firm value net of amounts diverted (d) and expropriated by the government (m), g(1 - 
d)(1 - m), less the cost of diversion cd2/2. That is, the manager chooses d to maximize 
2 / ) 1 )( 1 (
2 cd m d g d M − − − + =  .                (1) 
We assume that the government is completely “Machiavellian.” Thus, unlike the case of 
taxation, the resources expropriated are consumed entirely and nothing is spent on improving 
the legal environment, enhancing the economic infrastructure, or establishing anti-corruption 
campaigns.9  We  also  assume  that  the  quality  of  the  legal  regime  c  and  the  degree  of  state 
predation  are  independent.  Our  model  predictions  do  not  change  if  countries  with  more 
benevolent governments are modeled to have better corporate laws.10  
The government expropriates fraction m of post-diversion firm value (1 - d) and receives (1 – 
d)m. Expropriation costs the government (1 – d)
αm2k/2, which decreases with state predation 
(1/k). Parameter 0 ≤ α < 1 measures the elasticity of diversion from smaller companies relative 
to larger ones, such that it is costlier for government to seize, for example, 50% of the firm 
profits from a smaller company than from a larger one. We think this assumption is reasonable 
because  expropriation  from  small  firms  can  lead  to  firm  bankruptcy  and  worker  layoffs, 
creating negative publicity for the government and increasing the chances of eventual detection 
of expropriation and subsequent punishment. In a dynamic setting, the government might also 
                                                 
8 The results also hold if the owner of the firm holds less than 100% of the firm and minority shareholders 
own the rest. In our case, the minority shareholders can be viewed as firm owners who coordinate their 
actions. 
9 Although tax revenues can be used to improve the efficacy of the legal environment, selective taxation 
and  unofficial  levies  imposed  by  the  mafia  place  a  burden  on  business  activity  in  many  emerging 
economies. For example, Black and Tarassova (2003) note, “Corruption and organized crime impose large 
unofficial  taxes  on  business  activity.  Official  taxes  can  be  equally  important.  It  is  a  close  question  whether 
corruption and organized crime or the tax system was the largest drag on business activity in Russia during the 
1990s. Russia’s enterprise tax rules during the 1990s embodied almost every flaw one can imagine. The tax rules 
imposed confiscatory marginal income tax rates, were changed frequently and arbitrarily, were enforced even more 
arbitrarily, and all this effort produced ever smaller amounts of revenue.” 
10  Alternatively,  one  can  assume  that  it  is  managerial  income,  d  +  g(1  -  d),  from  which  the  state 
expropriates (as perhaps in case of bribes) and not company income (1 - d). The main predictions of our 
model do not change if this is the case.    10 
be more concerned about losing a company they can extract rents from if they force a small 
company to bankruptcy by expropriating large amounts.11  
For the sake of notational simplicity, we derive our model predictions assuming α = 0. The 
results are identical for any 0 ≤ α < 1. The government’s objective function is then to choose m 
such that it maximizes the expropriated funds net of costs, 
        2 / ) 1 (
2 km m d G − − =  .                   (2) 
 
B. Managerial Diversion and State Expropriation Equilibrium 
First,  we  find  managerial  diversion  d  and  government  expropriation  m.  Given  the 
equilibrium levels of m and d, we solve for the owner’s choice of governance g. 
Maximizing  Equations  (1)  and  (2)  with  respect  to  d  and  m,  respectively,  the  reaction 
functions for managerial diversion and state expropriation are 
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If  the  state  expropriates  more  (larger  m),  managers  divert  a  greater  fraction  of  revenue 
because  every  dollar  stolen  from  the  firm’s  owners  is  not  shared  with  the  government. 
However, this effect is lessened if governance is stronger (higher g). State expropriation is lower 
when managerial diversion d is higher, that is, when there is less revenue left over for the 
government to seize.   
Solving Equations (3) and (4) simultaneously, we obtain the following equilibrium levels of 
diversion d and state expropriation m as functions of the model’s exogenous parameters: firm 
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and 
                                                 
11 The following example clarifies these points. Consider a state with predation parameter (1/k) = 1/2 and 
two firms (N and Y) of equal size of $1. The manager of firm N does not divert (dN = 0), while the 
manager of firm Y diverts 90% of profits (dY = 90%). The costs of state expropriation are then mN for firm 
N, and 0.1
α ∗ mY for firm Y. If α = 0, the same degree of punishment is imposed on firms Y and N (mY = 
mN),  independent  of  their  post-managerial  diversion  levels.  On  the  other  hand,  if  α  =  1,  then  the 
government has to expropriate 10 times more from firm Y (mY = 10mN) than from firm N to incur the same 
cost. In an intermediate case, for example, α = 0.5, then mY = 3.16mN. Our contention is that the case of α = 
1 is the least plausible.  
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Managerial diversion decreases as anti-diversion laws become stricter (higher c) and increases 
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Diversion is lower when firm governance g is stronger as long as the state does not expropriate 
all of the firm’s assets (m < 1):  
0
) (












d  ,                  (9) 
where 1+c(k-1) > 0. 
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As investor protection improves (higher c) or firm governance becomes stronger (larger g), a 
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Although the above signs may seem counterintuitive, they can be explained as follows. As 
the  cost  of  managerial  diversion  increases  (higher  c)  or  the  manager’s  incentives  are  more 
closely tied to value maximization (higher g), managerial diversion decreases, leaving more 
income  for  the  government  to  expropriate.  As  we  discussed  above,  government  capture 
increases if there is more income to be taken from the firm.   
 
C. Firm Governance 
Firm value is defined as the amount of funds remaining after diversion and expropriation, V 
= (1 - d)(1 - m). Using Equation (3), V becomes a function of firm governance structure (g), 
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where the first term in the square brackets is (1-d) and the second term is (1-m). Firm owners 
choose governance structure g to maximize V. The first-order condition is  
0
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The governance choice that maximizes firm value is then 
2 2
* + − = c ck g  .                   (15) 
From  Equation  (15),  the  optimal  firm  governance  is  decreasing  in  the  level  of  government 
predation (lower k).  
 
Prediction 1: In more predatory states, owners set up weaker governance structures. 
 
Intuitively, if government expropriation risk is high, the owners have incentives to distort 
managerial incentives from pure value maximization by establishing weaker governance. On 
the one hand, the owners lose out because now the managers divert more. On the other hand, 
the owners benefit from the imperfect governance because when the managers divert more, the 
states  expropriate  a  lower  fraction  of  firm  revenues.  In  equilibrium,  the  owners  prefer 
managerial diversion to state capture because a greater fraction of firm profits would otherwise 
be seized by the governments. 
 
D. Firm Valuation 
Firms are valued higher in countries with less predatory governments. This result follows 
from the sign of the partial derivative of firm value with respect to government predation, 
0
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Prediction 2: Firms are valued lower in more predatory states. 
 
It is noteworthy that the value increase comes from two sources. First, there is a direct effect 
of lower expropriation under less predatory governments ( 0 / < ∂ ∂ k m ). Second, managers have 
lower incentives to divert firm resources in less predatory states ( 0 / < ∂ ∂ k d ).   
As in many governance or ownership models, in equilibrium governance has no effect on 
firm value since the governance structure is set up optimally to maximize firm value. However,   13 
our objective is to shed light on the interaction between governance and predation, that is, on 
how  the  relation  between  governance  and  firm  value  changes  when  governments  are 
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Prediction 3: The relation between firm governance and valuation is weaker in more predatory states. 
 
The intuition behind this result can be illustrated by considering the extreme cases. When 
government predation is infinitely expensive, there is no room for government interference and 
firm  value  increases  monotonically  with  firm  governance.  In  contrast,  when  government 
policies are extremely predatory, that is, when the cost of government expropriation is close to 
zero, a small decrease in managerial diversion (due to stronger governance) leads to a large 
increase  in  state  expropriation.  In  this  case,  firm  value  decreases  as  governance  becomes 
stronger.  
Firm  governance  can  be  a  function  of  multiple  firm  and  industry  parameters,  such  as 
investment opportunities, the need for external financing, competitiveness, and informational 
environment. To keep the model tractable, firm and industry characteristics are left outside the 
scope of our model. However, we conjecture that firm and industry characteristics matter less in 
countries in which governments pursue policies of self-enrichment. Extending this argument, 
we also expect that within-country variation in governance practices is lower in more predatory 
states,  after  controlling  for  variability  in  firm  and  industry  characteristics  that  explain  firm 
governance.  
 
Prediction 4: The sensitivities of firm governance to firm and industry characteristics and within-country 
variation in governance are lower in more predatory states.  
 
We admit that there may be reasons other than the ones mentioned above for firms to set up 
weaker  governance  structures  in  more  predatory  states.  For  example,  politically  connected 
firms  are  less  likely  to  suffer  from  government  intervention  (Fisman  (2001);  Faccio  (2005); 
Bertrand et al. (2006); Leuz and Oberholzer (2006)). The consumption of benefits that come from 
preferable treatment by the state requires opaqueness. Thus, such firms are likely to observe 
inferior governance, and they are more likely to be found in countries with more predatory   14 
governments. One may also reach our predictions using alternative modeling approaches. For 
example, using a signaling model, Khanna, Kogan, and Palepu (2002) illustrate that profitable 
firms have fewer incentives to stand out from a “murky pond” of non-transparent companies. 
Finally,  there  are  various  ways  to  model  firm  governance.  Voluntary  firm  governance 
provisions  may  increase  the  cost  of  managerial  diversion  in  a  similar  fashion  to  state  anti-
diversion laws. Durnev and Kim (2005) model firms’ governance choice directly as parameter d, 
the proportion of funds diverted by managers. Not only do these methods result in similar 
predictions, but it also simplifies the algebra significantly.   
 
IV. Data 
This  section  describes  our  data  sources  and  the  main  variables  of  our  model.  Detailed 
definitions of the variables appear in Table I. 
 
A. Predation and Autocracy 
Many  economies  limit  the  scope  of  government  intervention  in  private  businesses.  For 
example,  the  U.S.  Constitution  explicitly  prohibits  government  intervention  in  interstate 
commerce. Although these same states are supposed to be protectors of private property rights, 
in many economies they are the chief violators of these rights. 
In this section, we construct several indexes that we believe reflect the multi-dimensional 
aspect of state interference, including factors such as corruption, disrespect of property rights, 
unfair regulation, and mafia presence. As Hall and Jones (1999) note, any such index is only a 
noisy  measure  of  imperfectly  observed  predation  policies.  This  noise  creates  an  errors-in-
variables problem that may bias one’s empirical estimates. Later in the paper, we attempt to 
mitigate  this  potential  bias  by,  first,  relying  on  a  unique  firm  survey  on  directly  observed 
obstacles imposed by government interference and, second, using instruments for the predation 
measure.  
We  employ  two  measures  of  the  effectiveness  (more  precisely,  the  lack  thereof)  of 
institutional and economic systems in curbing government predation. The first effectiveness 
measure is the predation index. This index consists of seven distinct attributes: (i) corruption (the 
degree to which corruption distorts economic and financial environment); (ii) risk of government 
expropriation;  (iii)  lack  of  property  rights  protection;  (iv)  government  stance  towards  business 
(assessment of the likelihood that the current government will implement business-unfriendly 
policies);  (v)  freedom  to  compete  (assessment  of  government  policies  towards  establishing  a   15 
competitive market environment); (vi) quality of bureaucracy (assessment of whether bureaucracy 
impedes fair business practices); and (vii) impact of crime (assessment of whether crime impedes 
private  businesses  development).  The  corruption  index  is  obtained  from  Transparency 
International (TI), while the rest of the indexes come from the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). 
We define the predation index as the sum of the seven attributes. In our analysis, we use the 
aggregate index as well as its individual components.   
The second effectiveness measure is based on a country’s political system – the degree of 
government autocracy. During the last two centuries the world has moved from a monarchy-
based leadership structure to the development of bureaucracies with high capacities to regulate, 
tax, and mobilize people in the service of state policy. This transformation generally followed 
one of two paths, toward either autocracy or plural democracy. In pursuit of self-enrichment, 
autocratic rulers are more likely to set up extortion regimes and are less subject to checks and 
balances from democratic institutions by, for example, inhibiting independent media (Egorov, 
Guriev, and Sonin (2007)). 
To measure the degree of government autocracy, we use a popular political data set, POLITY 
IV. For every country in the world, the POLITY records autocracy and democracy indexes. Our 
autocracy index is constructed using a two-step procedure to account for the fact that some 
countries grant exemplary freedoms to private enterprises but are classified as autocratic (for 
example, Singapore). First, as suggested by the POLITY database, we subtract the democracy 
index from the autocracy index. We further note that even if a country is classified as autocratic, 
the quality of government policies might be influenced by government stability. An autocratic 
government that is not stable has greater incentives to extract rents for self-enrichment during 
its brief tenure. Thus, we also add the government instability index from the Investor Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG) to the constructed autocracy index. Government instability is an assessment 
of the government's ability to stay in office and carry out its declared programs, depending 
upon such factors as the type of governance, cohesion of the government and governing parties, 
and the approach of an election.  
 
B. Firm Governance 
For our analysis, we use four distinct and comprehensive data sets (that are available and 
known  to  the  authors)  on  firm  governance,  transparency,  and  obstacles  imposed  by 
governments.  Specifically,  we  rely  on  firm  indicators  from  CLSA’s  2000-2001  Governance 
Indicators, S&P’s 1997-2002 Transparency Rankings, Institutional Shareholder Services’ (ISS) 2003-  16 
2006  International  Corporate  Governance  Quotients,  and  the  World  Bank’s  2000  World  Business 
Environment Survey (WBES). The four data sets cover over 20,000 firms (including small firms) 
from more than 85 countries. A broad set of countries from every continent is included, ranging 
from  underdeveloped  nations  (Ethiopia,  Malawi,  Tanzania,  Nigeria,  Haiti)  to  the  most 
advanced economies (Hong Kong, Singapore, Germany, Japan, the U.K., the U.S.). 
 
B.1. CLSA Governance Sample 
The first proxy for firm governance comes from the reports issued by CLSA in 2000 and 
2001 (CLSA Emerging Markets (2001, 2002)). These reports assign governance scores to firms in 
East Asia, South Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe.12 The data cover 606 firms in 25 
countries. There are 494 firms in 2000, 500 firms in 2001, and 388 firms in both 2001 and 2002. 
The governance indicators are based on answers from financial analysts to 57 questions 
(Appendix A) used to construct scores on a 1-100 scale, where a higher number indicates better 
corporate  governance.  All  questions  have  binary  answers  (yes/no)  to  reduce  analysts’ 
subjectivity.  Scores  on  the  57  questions  are  grouped  into  seven  categories:  (i)  managerial 
incentives and discipline towards value-maximizing actions (9 attributes); (ii) timeliness and 
accuracy  of  financial  information  disclosure  (10  attributes);  (iii)  board  independence  (7 
attributes);  (iv)  board  accountability  (8  attributes);  (v)  enforcement  and  management 
accountability (6 attributes); and (vi) minority shareholder protection (10 attributes). We use the 
composite  governance  index  (CLSA  governance)  defined  as  0.15  times  the  sum  of  the  six 
individual attributes.13  
We construct a series of firm, industry, and country variables.14 All firm variables come 
from the Worldscope data set. The rationale for including these variables is explained in detail in 
Durnev and Kim (2005) and Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2006). Two variables are included as 
firm  determinants  of  governance:  firm  growth  opportunities  and  industry  dependence  on 
                                                 
12 Part of these data (for the year 2000) were used in Khanna, Kogan, and Palepu (2006), Chen, Chen, and 
Wei, (2003), Klapper and Love (2003), Krishnamurty, Sevic, and Sevic (2003), Durnev and Kim (2004), and 
Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2006). 
13 CLSA claims that its rankings are objective. In support of this claim, the South China Morning Post 
reported in 2001 that CLSA lost most of its corporate finance business with the companies that were given 
low  corporate  governance  scores.  Because  of  this,  CLSA  has  blocked  public  access  to  firm-specific 
governance scores beginning in 2002. Durnev and Kim (2005) and Khanna, Kogan, and Palepu (2006) 
further support the reliability of the CLSA composite scores by documenting a positive and significant 
relation between CLSA scores and corporate scandals that appeared in the business press.  
14 All independent variable are defined identically for the CLSA, S&P, and ISS samples.   17 
external  financing.15  To  measure  firm  growth  opportunities  we  use  past  (lagged  by  one  year) 
growth in sales. Following Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2006), we 
compute past industry dependence on external financing as the industry median value of capital 
expenditures minus cash flows from operations divided by capital expenditures. This variable 
is  calculated  on  a  3-digit  SIC  industry  level  using  the  sample  of  all  U.S.  firms  included  in 
COMPUSTAT ten years prior to the formation dates of the governance variables. It is then 
matched (by 4-digit SIC code) with non-U.S. firms from our governance sample. Note that this 
approach  assumes  that  U.S.  capital  markets  are  frictionless  and  that  non-U.S.  firms  have  a 
similar need for external financing to U.S. firms.16  
Because larger firms are generally more transparent, we include firm size as a control. Firm 
size is defined as the past log of total assets. Cash, defined as past cash over total assets, controls 
for the possibility of free-cash flow problems. We control for whether a firm issues ADRs by 
adding the cross-listing dummy, which is equal to one if a firm’s shares are listed on a U. S. 
exchange. Industry dummies are also included using the 2-digit SIC industry classification as in 
Campbell (1996).17 Following Doidge et al. (2002), we measure firm valuation as the sum of total 
assets and the market value of equity less book value of equity over total assets.  
Several  country-level  indicators  are  constructed  to  account  for  country  economic  and 
financial development, the quality of the legal environment, the size of unofficial economy, and 
alternative  governance  mechanisms.  Real  GDP  per  capita  and  the  ratio  of  stock  market 
capitalization to GDP are included in all regressions to proxy for the degree of economic and 
financial  development,  respectively.  These  variables  are  taken  from  the  World  Bank’s  World 
Development Indicators. Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2006) contend that the incentives to reform 
governance are lower for firms in countries with underdeveloped stock markets.  
We measure the quality of the legal regime using three variables. First, we use the anti-self 
dealing index from Djankov, La Porta, and Shleifer (2006) and used in Aggarwal et al. (2007). 
This index is an aggregate measure of legal rules and private enforcement mechanisms, such as 
                                                 
15 Unlike Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2006), we do not include ownership concentration (closely-held 
shares from Worldscope) as a firm governance determinant in our reported results because it reduces our 
sample  size  by  40%.  However,  all  of  our  results  in  the  paper  remain  robust  to  the  inclusion  of  this 
variable.  
16 The results are robust to an alternative definition of firm-level external financing as in Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Maksimovic (1998). We measure it as the difference between required investment and internally 
available  capital  for  investment.  Required  investment  is  estimated  by  an  annual  growth  rate  in  total 
assets. Internally available capital for investment is defined as ROE/(1-ROE), where ROE is net income 
over total equity. 
17 The results are robust to the inclusion of lagged R&D expenditure scaled by sales as a measure of assets 
intangibility.    18 
disclosure, approval, and litigation, governing a specific self-dealing transaction based on ex-
ante and ex-post control of self-dealing. As a robustness check, we also include an updated 
investor protection index from Djankov, La Porta, and Shleifer (2006) and a de facto measure of 
law enforcement, ICRG’s rule of law. The rule of law variable is a quantitative assessment of the 
strength of a country’s tradition of law and order.18  
Predatory government policies are associated with a greater market share of an unofficial 
(black market) economy. We therefore control for a state’s black market assessment using the 
World  Competitiveness  Yearbook’  measure  of  the  extent  to  which  the  black  market  economy 
impairs economic development. Finally, freedom of press is used as an indicator of alternative 
governance mechanisms (see Dyck and Zingales (2002); Dyck, Volchkova, and Zingales (2006)). 
The  variable  comes  from  Journalists  without  Borders  and  is  based  on  50  criteria  including 
journalists’ murders, imprisonment, physical attacks, and threats.  
Table  II  reports  the  summary  statistics  for  the  CLSA  governance  sample.  The  sample 
represents both developed countries and emerging economies. Correlation coefficients in Table 
III  indicate  that  firms  score  higher  on  corporate  governance  in  more  economically  and 
financially  developed  countries  and  in  countries  with  lower  corruption,  lower  risk  of 
expropriation, better property rights protection, more freedom to compete, better quality of 
bureaucracy, and less autocratic governments. Firms that are better governed are also valued 
higher.  Table  III  also  contains  correlation  coefficients  between  individual  attributes  of  the 
predation index, the autocracy index, the macro-economic variables, and the legal environment 
variables. The individual components of the predation index (corruption, risk of government 
expropriation, lack of property rights protection, government stance towards business, freedom 
to compete, quality of bureaucracy, and impact of crime) are highly positively correlated. In 
more  advanced  economies,  as  measured  by  GDP  per  capita,  there  is  less  corruption,  better 
protection of property rights, more freedom to compete, more business-friendly governments, 
better quality of bureaucracy, and less crime. Generally, the same can be concluded about less 




                                                 
18 Our results hold if we control for the country corporate tax burden from the EIU. It is defined as the 
assessment  of  how  corporate  taxation  impedes  the  development  of  private  businesses.  We  use  this 
variable  to  distinguish  between  confiscatory  taxation  and  taxes  that  serve  a  beneficial  role  such  as 
reforming the legal environment.   19 
B.2 S&P Transparency Sample 
Standard & Poor’s conducted a survey of 1,600 companies around the globe concerning 
firms' transparency and disclosure. The companies comprise one of S&P’s global indexes. The 
strength of the survey lies in the objectivity and clarity of its methodology.19  
Transparency and disclosure are evaluated by searching for the inclusion of 91 possible 
information  items  (Appendix  B).  These  91  items  were  selected  after  examining  the  annual 
reports and other accounts of leading companies around the world and identifying the most 
common disclosure items. The inclusion of each item is scored on a binary basis (“yes” denotes 
included and “no” denotes not included) to ensure objectivity. Each “yes” answer is equal to 
one point. These items are then grouped into three sub-categories: (i) ownership structure and 
investor relations (22 items); financial transparency and information disclosure (34 items); and 
board  and  management  structure  and  process  (35  items).  We  define  an  aggregate  S&P 
transparency index as the sum of these three categories. The index ranges from 0 to 91 with a 
higher score representing more transparency and disclosure. The sample includes 1,494 firms 
from 40 countries. The panel of firms is unbalanced.  There are 144, 388, 413, 573, and 178 firms 
in years 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000, respectively. Since a part of the empirical analysis requires a 
balanced panel (for example, when we need to express some of the variables in differences), the 
number of observations in the resulting balanced panel is lower than in the unbalanced one.  
The advantage of the S&P scores lies in their objectivity, whereas the CLSA scores are more 
comprehensive but susceptible to subjectivity. However, the S&P scores depend only on the 
number of disclosures, and do not reflect the content of such disclosures. They are best viewed 
as  a  measure  of  transparency  and  not  a  comprehensive  measure  of  corporate  governance. 
Notwithstanding these differences, the two sets of rankings turn out to be fairly consistent. The 
correlation coefficient between CLSA’s and S&P’s scores is 0.17 (p-value = 0.000) (see Table II).  
Table II reports the summary statistics of the S&P sample. Similar to the CLSA sample, firms 
that disclose more information are valued higher (Table III). Firms generally score higher in 
terms of S&P transparency in more developed countries and in countries with less predatory 




                                                 
19 A part of this data set is used in Durnev and Kim (2004), Khanna, Palepu, and Srinivasan (2004), and 
Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2006). 
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B.3. ISS International Corporate Governance Quotients 
One of the most comprehensive international governance data sets, Corporate Governance 
Quotients,  is  compiled  by  the  ISS.  These  data  are  used  in  Aggarwal  and  Williams  (2006), 
Aggarwal et al. (2007), Bruno and Claessens (2007), and Chhaochharia and Laeven (2007). The 
ISS cover a comprehensive sample of firms (7,901) from 22 countries (Table II). Although the 
majority of companies come from the U.S. (5,476), compared to other firm governance data sets 
the ISS data provide the best coverage (in terms of the number of governance items and the 
number of firms) for non-U.S. companies. The non-U.S. firms are part of the major international 
stock indexes: the MSCI EAFE index, the FTSE All Share index, the FTSE All World Developed 
index, and the S&P/TSX index. The data are available for the years from 2003 through 2006. 
There are 1,710 non-U.S. firms (5,533 U.S. firms) in 2003, 1,696 (5,344) in 2004, 1,708 (5419) in 
2005, and 2,363 (5,476) in 2006. The drawback of the ISS data set is that the companies are 
mostly from developed countries in which governments generally respect property rights and 
score low on corruption. Despite the potential drawbacks to the ISS data set, we utilize it for 
some of our empirical tests.  
As in Aggarwal et al. (2007), we identify 44 governance attributes that are aggregated into 
the ISS governance (Appendix C). The index assigns a value of one to a governance attribute if 
the  company  meets  or  exceeds  minimum  satisfactory  standards  in  a  specific  category.  The 
attributes  are  split  into  four  sub-categories:  (i)  board  (25  attributes  related  to  board 
independence, board size, transparency, and effectiveness); (ii) audit (3 attributes related to the 
independence of the audit committee); (iii) anti-takeover (6 attributes related to charters and 
bylaws);  and  (iv)  compensation  and  ownership  (10  attributes  related  to  options,  stock 
ownership, and monitoring of director compensation). The index is calculated for December 
2005. 
We observe from the correlation coefficients in Table III that ISS governance is positively 
and significantly correlated with S&P transparency and not related to CLSA governance (only 
18 firms belong to both the ISS and CLSA samples). ISS governance is correlated neither with 
firm valuation nor with GDP per capita. Although ISS governance is negatively related to the 
predation index, it is positively correlated with the autocracy index. These results should be 
interpreted with care because there is little variation in country variables in the ISS sample. 
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B.4 World Business Environment Survey Sample 
Admittedly,  similar  predatory  policies  may  have  different  effects  on  firms  in  the  same 
country. For example, larger and more profitable companies will generally have more funds to 
spend on bribing corrupt officials to guard against state expropriation. In addition, these same 
firms can protect themselves by seeking political connections. Political connections are often 
unobservable and hard to measure (Faccio (2006)), and the described data sets (CLSA, S&P, and 
ISS) are subject to these problems. We partially overcome this hurdle by using the World Bank’s 
WBES (Appendix D). This is a firm-level survey that provides information (over 170 variables) 
on  a  firm’s  perception  of  obstacles  to  financing,  development,  and  growth  imposed  by 
government  policies;  the  survey  variables  include  factors  such  as  overregulation,  bribes, 
extortion, taxes, quality of courts, political stability, and poor infrastructure.  
The survey was conducted for 10,032 firms from 81 developing and developed countries in 
1999 and 2000. The scope of countries is very broad, ranging from the poorest (Ethiopia and 
Malawi) to the richest (the U.S. and Germany). According to the summary statistics reported in 
Table IV, Turkey contains the lowest number of firms (50), whereas Thailand contains the most 
firms (422). Small companies (less than 50 employees), medium companies (more than 50 but 
less than 500 employees), and large companies (more than 500 employees) comprise 40, 40, and 
20 percent of the sample, respectively. The data contain both private and public companies. Due 
to restrictions on control variables, the final sample size varies from 4,000 to 7,000 firms from 79 
countries. 
Although the identity of the companies is unknown, the survey contains basic information 
on firm performance, sales, capital structure, ownership structure, and accounting practices. 
The  anonymity  of  the  interviewed  firms  encouraged  correct  responses  from  the  firms.  The 
WBES  dataset  is  used  by  Beck,  Demirgüç-Kunt,  and  Maksimovic  (2005)  and  Ayyagagri, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005, 2006) to examine how firms perceive property rights 
protection  and  how  financing  constraints  hamper  firm  development.  They  discover  that 
financial obstacles imposed by government interference, discretionary taxation, corruption, and 
crime suppress firm growth, particularly in small companies.  
The  WBES  data  set  does  not  include  conventional  governance  variables;  however,  we 
identify one firm item that represents the desire of firms to become more transparent. The item 
is whether a firm chooses to have its financial statements audited. We define audit as a variable 
that  takes  a  value  of  one  if  a  firm’s  financial  statements  are  audited  and  zero  otherwise.  
Although this measure of firm transparency is much  narrower compared to the transparency   22 
attributes in the CLSA or S&P data sets, we believe this drawback is compensated by the large 
number of firm observations.20 
The  firms’  evaluation  of  obstacles  imposed  by  corruption,  taxation  and  regulation,  and 
crime are based on answers to the following questions: “Please judge on a four-point scale 
where 4 means a major and 1 means no obstacle how problematic (i) is corruption for operation 
and growth of your business; (ii) are taxes and regulation for operation and growth of your 
business; (iii) are organized crime and mafia for operation and growth of your business.” The 
composite obstacles index is formed as the sum of the three components. Since the predation and 
autocracy  indexes  cannot  be  defined  for  a  number  of  countries  in  the  WBES  sample,  the 
composite obstacles variable serves as a substitute.  
The assessment of laws and regulations on the company level consists of three categories: (i) 
availability  of  laws  and  regulations;  (ii)  predictability  of  laws  and  regulations;  and  (iii)  
confidence in the judicial system.21  We use this variable to measure how legal structure and the 
quality of regulation affect firms’ operations. 
Firm  performance  is  measured  by  the  estimated  (reported  by  the  companies)  percentage 
growth rate in future sales.22 We employ future rather than past sales (as in Demirgüç-Kunt, 
and Maksimovic (2005)) to reduce endogeneity. Country rate of inflation is included to control 
for the stability of sales growth estimates. Firm size is controlled for by a variable that takes a 
value of one for small firms, two for medium firms, and three for large firms. To account for the 
monitoring role of foreign investors, a foreign ownership variable (the percentage of the company 
owned by foreign investors) is included. We also control for state ownership because firms can 
seek  protection  from  predatory  governments  by  increasing  government  ownership  stake. 
Finally, sector dummies (manufacturing, services, agriculture, and other) are included to control 
for differences in accounting practice and regulation.  
The summary statistics and correlation coefficients for the WBES sample are reported in 
Table V. Some notable findings emerge from this table. Firms that have a poorer assessment of 
                                                 
20 Mitton (2002) uses a similar variable to define transparency in a study of how legal environment affects 
firm transparency. 
21 The score is cumulative and based on the answers to the following three questions: (i) "In general, 
information on the laws and regulations affecting my firm is easy to obtain" (The possible answers are: 1. 
Fully disagree; 2. Disagree in most cases; 3. Tend to disagree; 4. Tend to agree; 5. Agree in most cases; and 
6. Fully agree); (ii) "In general, interpretations of laws and regulations affecting my firm are consistent 
and predictable" (1. Fully disagree; 2. Disagree in most cases; 3. Tend to disagree; 4. Tend to agree; 5. 
Agree  in  most  cases;  and  6.  Fully  agree);  (iii)  “In  resolving  business  disputes,  do  you  believe  your 
country's court system?” (1. Never; 2. Seldom; 3. Sometimes; 4. Frequently; 5. Usually; and 6. Always). 
22 The WBES data set precludes us from calculating a Tobin’s Q.   23 
laws  and  regulations  and  report  more  obstacles  to  their  development  due  to  unfair  taxes, 
corruption, and crime are more likely to be located in less economically developed countries 
and in countries with more predatory governments, more autocratic rulers, and worse legal 
environments.  Firms  with  audited  financial  statements  show  better  performance.  Better 
performing  firms  are  located  in  countries  with  better  laws  and  regulations  and  with  fewer 
reported  development  obstacles.  We  observe  that  larger  firms  (based  on  the  number  of 
employees)  are  more  likely  to  have  audited  statements.  Firms  with  higher  foreign  (state) 
ownership perform better (worse). Nonetheless, firms face fewer obstacles if their foreign or 
state ownership levels are larger. 
 
V. Results 
In this section, we report the empirical results. Given that observations on individual firms 
in a given country are likely to be correlated, all standard errors and reported p-values are 
calculated using clustered (by country) robust standard errors (see Petersen (2006)).23  
In the CLSA sample, the governance scores are either for the year 2000 or 2001. In the S&P 
samples, the transparency data are for either 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, or 2001. The ISS governance 
data  are  for  December  2005.  The  WBES  data  are  for  2000.  To  reduce  endogeneity,  the 
independent variables in all regressions are lagged by one year.  
 
A. Does Predation Affect Firm Governance? 
Prediction 1 states that firms practice weaker governance in more predatory states. We first 
present graphical evidence by plotting country averages of governance against the predation 
index (the CLSA, S&P, and ISS samples) and the composite obstacles index (the WBES sample). 
To remove the impact of firm, industry, and country (other than predation) factors that are 
related to governance, we calculate abnormal levels of governance. Abnormal governance is 
measured as the residuals from an OLS regression of CLSA governance, S&P transparency, and 
ISS governance on growth opportunities, industry dependence on external financing, size, cash, 
the cross-listing dummy, anti-self dealing, GDP per capita, market capitalization, black market, 
freedom of press, and industry dummies.  For the WBES sample, the residuals are from a probit 
regression of audit on laws and regulations, firm size, foreign ownership, GDP per capita, and 
industry dummies.  
                                                 
23 We cannot rely on country fixed effects because both firm-specific and country-specific variables are 
used in the same regressions.   24 
Figure 2 displays country averages of abnormal governance and transparency as a function 
of predation (Panel A for the CLSA, Panel B for the S&P, Panel C for the ISS, and Panel D for the 
WBES  samples).  The  intercepts  and  slopes  of  the  displayed  lines  are  determined  by  OLS 
regressions of country average abnormal firm governance and transparency on the predation 
index (Panels A-C) and on the composite obstacles index (Panel D). In Panels A-C, we observe 
from each of the graphs that abnormal governance is worse (lower) in countries with more 
predatory governments. Panel D shows that the abnormal level of the audit dummy is lower in 
countries with greater composite obstacles (as measured by the sum of crime-based obstacles, 
tax and regulation-based obstacles, and corruption-based obstacles). The slopes of the lines in 
all of the graphs are significant at the 5% level. 
Next, we turn our attention to the regression analysis and present the baseline regression 
results  in  Table  VI.  Panel  A  examines  the  CLSA,  S&P,  and  ISS  samples.  In  the  first  three 
specifications, we regress CLSA governance on predation, autocracy, and the predation index 
subcomponents  separately  (corruption,  risk  of  government  expropriation,  lack  of  property 
rights  protection,  government  stance  towards  business,  freedom  to  compete,  quality  of 
bureaucracy, impact of crime), in each case using our control variables (growth opportunities, 
industry  dependence  on  external  financing,  size,  cash,  the  cross-listing  dummy,  anti-self 
dealing, GDP per capita, financial development, black market, freedom of press, and industry 
dummies). In the first regression, we observe that predation is negative and significant at the 
5%  level.  This  implies  that  in  countries  with  higher  predation,  firms  score  lower  on  CLSA 
governance. The second regression shows this same negative relation with autocracy and CLSA 
governance scores. When we break up predation into the seven subcomponents, we notice that 
the predation variables that show a negative and significant impact on CLSA governance are 
corruption, quality of bureaucracy, and impact of crime. In each of the three regressions, growth 
opportunities, dependence on external financing, anti-self dealing, and market capitalization are 
all  positive  and  significant,  consistent  with  prior  findings  by  Black,  Jang,  and  Kim  (2006a), 
Durnev and Kim (2005), and Bruno and Claessens (2007).  
When we regress S&P transparency on the same set of variables, we find that with higher 
predation or greater autocracy firms disclose less information. The subcomponents of predation 
that are negative and significant on transparency are corruption, government stance towards 
business,  freedom  to  compete,  quality  of  bureaucracy,  and  impact  of  crime.  Growth 
opportunities,  dependence  on  external  financing,  size,  the  cross-listing  dummy,  anti-self   25 
dealing,  market  capitalization,  and  freedom  of  press  positively  and  significantly  affect  firm 
transparency, whereas cash negatively affects transparency.  
In the last three regressions of Panel A, we use ISS governance as the dependent variable. 
Again,  we  document  that  greater  predation  but  not  autocracy  is  associated  with  lower 
governance.24  Growth  opportunities,  size,  and  market  capitalization  have  a  positive  and 
significant  effect  on  ISS  governance.  We  do  not  observe  a  significant  relation  between 
corruption and ISS governance, in contrast to the regressions with CLSA governance and S&P 
transparency  as  the  dependent  variables.  Only  one  predation  component  is  significant  – 
government stance towards business.25 
Panel B of Table VIII makes use of the WBES audit dummy as the dependent variable in 
probit regressions on the composite obstacles, its subcomponents (crime-based obstacles, tax 
and regulation-based obstacles, and corruption-based obstacles), firm assessment of laws and 
regulations, firm size, foreign ownership, and GDP per capita. We first observe that when the 
composite obstacles index is high, the firm’s financial statements are less likely to be audited. 
However, firms that have higher assessment of laws and regulations, larger firms, and firms 
with  a  higher  percentage  of  foreign  ownership  are  more  likely  to  have  audited  financial 
statements. In the second regression in Panel B, obstacles due to taxes and regulations and 
corruption, but not those due to crime, are negatively and significantly related to the audit 
dummy. We conclude that all the results in Table VI are consistent with Prediction 1, which 
posits that firms in more predatory states set up weaker governance structures and disclose less.   
 
B. Does Predation Lower Firm Performance? 
Next, we test whether firms are valued lower in more predatory states (Prediction 2). We 
measure firm valuation using Tobin’s Q (the CLSA, S&P, and ISS samples) as the dependent 
variable in our regression analyses. The dependent variable for performance in Panel B (the 
WBES sample) is the estimated future percentage change in sales.   
The results are presented in Table VII. The controls are past growth opportunities, firm size, 
the cross-listing dummy, anti-self dealing, GDP per capita, financial development, and industry 
dummies in Panel A (the CLSA, S&P, and ISS samples), and laws and regulations, firm size, 
                                                 
24 Presumably, autocracy is insignificant because the ISS sample covers only developed countries. 
25 We check whether the results in Panels A-C are robust to the inclusion of ownership concentration as 
an additional governance determinant. Although we lose more than 40% of the sample, the magnitude 
and significance of the coefficients remain virtually unchanged. Additionally, the results are robust if we 
substitute the anti-self dealing variable as a proxy for legal environment with the investor protection and 
rule of law indexes.   26 
foreign ownership, state ownership, GDP per capita, inflation, and sector dummies in Panel B 
(the WBES sample). Consistent with the various studies already mentioned above, in eight out 
of  the  nine  regressions  in  Panel  A,  better-governed  and  more  transparent  firms  are  valued 
higher. 
The main results in Panel A of Table VII illustrate that in more predatory and autocratic 
states, firms are valued lower as measured by Tobin’s Q. Regarding the individual attributes 
within  the  predation  index,  the  results  on  predation  are  driven  by  corruption,  risk  of 
government  expropriation,  and  lack  of  property  rights  protection  in  the  CLSA  sample; 
corruption, risk of government expropriation, lack of property rights protection, freedom to 
compete, and crime in the S&P transparency sample; and corruption and bureaucracy in the ISS 
governance sample. Firms with greater growth opportunities and firms that are smaller in size 
are generally valued higher.  
Panel B of Table VII examines the WBES sample and uses the predicted percentage change 
in sales as the performance measure. We observe that firms with audited financial statements 
have higher growth rates in sales, but the growth rates are lower when the firms face more 
obstacles. When we examine the variables within the composite obstacles, we determine that 
both  taxes  and  regulation  and  corruption  are  responsible  for  the  decrease  in  sales  growth. 
Larger  firms  and  firms  with  greater  foreign  ownership  perform  better,  as  previously 
documented in Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005). State ownership has a negative 
albeit insignificant  impact  on firm  performance.  Inflation  attracts  a negative  and  significant 
coefficient.  Table  VII  clearly  supports  our  hypothesis  that  firms  perform  worse  in  more 
predatory and autocratic states.  
 
C. Predation and the Impact of Governance on Performance 
According to Prediction 3, governance likely has a weaker relation with performance in 
more  predatory  states.  We  test  this  prediction  using  several  methods.  First,  we  form  the 
interaction terms of firm governance with the predation and autocracy indexes. This approach 
may suffer from high correlations between the variables and their interaction terms, rendering 
some  coefficients  insignificant.  Thus,  we  rerun  the  “governance-performance”  regressions 
separately  on  high-  and  low-predation  and  autocracy  subsamples.  The  high  number  of 
observations in the ISS and WBES samples also allows us to run country-specific regressions 
and investigate how the relation between governance and performance varies from one country 
to another.    27 
Regressions in Table VIII are similar to those in Table VII, but now we include interaction 
terms of governance and disclosure with predation and autocracy for the CLSA, S&P, and ISS 
samples, and the audit dummy with the composite obstacles variable for the WBES sample. 
Panel A indicates that better governance and transparency do not always translate into higher 
firm valuation. Put differently, the relation between governance and valuation is not always 
positive and monotonic as found in the studies mentioned above. We can see this by examining 
the  interaction  terms  of  governance  and  transparency  with  predation  and  autocracy.  CLSA 
governance, S&P transparency, and ISS governance interacted with predation and autocracy are 
all negative (significant for CLSA governance and S&P transparency, and insignificant for ISS 
governance). We interpret these findings to imply that firms that practice good governance, or 
firms that are more transparent, are valued less in more predatory and autocratic states.
.26  
We explore the WBES sample in Panel B. Panel B reveals that firms that have their financial 
statements audited, but face more obstacles from crime, taxes and regulation, and corruption 
grow slower. As in our earlier analysis, we control for clustering at the country level in all the 
regressions. The individual coefficient on audit loses significance when the interaction term of 
audit with obstacles is included.  
In Table IX, we divide the sample into low- and high-predation, autocracy, and composite 
obstacles countries and rerun regressions similar to those in Table VIII. Low- (high-) predation, 
autocracy, and composite obstacles countries are defined as the bottom (top) quartile of values. 
Our belief (follows from Prediction 3) is that if governance and transparency matter less in high-
predation, autocracy, and obstacle countries, we should detect at most a weak relation between 
firm governance and firm performance and between transparency and firm performance in the 
top quartile of countries.27  
In Table IX, we notice from the CLSA sample that the positive coefficient on governance is 
significant for the low- and high-predation countries, as well as for the low- and high-autocratic 
countries.  The  S&P  sample,  however,  shows  that  transparency  only  positively  affects  firm 
valuation in the low-predation and autocratic states. We detect this same pattern for the audit 
dummy variable and performance for the WBES sample (Panel B). Auditing a firm’s financial 
                                                 
26 Using CLSA and S&P scores, Klapper and Love (2004) and Durnev and Kim (2005) find that firm 
governance matters more in countries with weaker legal environments. For robustness, we control for 
this by including interaction terms of legal regime variables (the investor protection index and the rule of 
law) with CLSA governance and S&P transparency. Consistent with prior findings, the interaction terms 
attract  negative,  albeit  insignificant,  coefficients.  The  rest  of  the  coefficients  do  not  change  their 
magnitudes or significance noticeably. 
27 This analysis is not performed on the ISS sample because the top and bottom quartiles contain firms 
from just one country.   28 
statements only significantly improves performance in the low-obstacle countries. In Table IX, 
we also test whether the coefficients obtained in the low-predation and autocracy subsamples 
are  significantly  different  from  those  obtained  using  the  high-predation  and  autocracy 
subsamples.28  The  differences  in  the  coefficients  turn  out  to  be  significant  across  all 
specifications of the S&P and WBES samples. 
In Table X, we utilize a large number of observations in the ISS and WBES samples and 
rerun the regression of Table VII separately for every country. In all of the regressions, we 
control for growth opportunities, firm size, the cross-listing dummy, and industry fixed effects 
in Panel A (the ISS sample), and firm size, foreign ownership, and sector dummies in Panel B 
(the WBES sample).  
In Panel A, country-specific coefficients on ISS governance are positive and significant in 
nearly  half  of  the  countries  and  they  mostly  appear  in  low-predation  countries.  As  we 
mentioned already, the ISS data set only contains developed economies and thus care needs to 
be taken in interpreting these results. Panel B of Table X covers the WBES sample, which does 
include developing countries along with the developed ones. In the WBES sample, the impact of 
the audit dummy on firm performance has less of an effect in countries with a greater average 
value  of  composite  obstacles  (higher  number  in  the  second  column).  The  positive  effect  of 
audited financial statements is present in 37 out of 60 countries and is significant at the 10% 
level  for  17  countries.  For  the  rest  of  countries,  the  beneficial  effect  of  audited  financial 
statements disappears altogether. 
To  formalize  this  pattern  in  governance-performance  sensitivities,  Figure  3  plots  the 
coefficient on governance against predation in Panel A (the ISS sample) and the coefficient on 
the audit dummy against the composite obstacles index in Panel B (the WBES sample). The 
coefficients are from the regressions presented in Table X. First, we identify from Panel A that 
the  sensitivity  of  valuation  to  governance  decreases  with  predation.  The  graph  in  Panel  B 
reveals that the sensitivity of firm performance (growth in sales) to the audit dummy variable is 
also decreasing in the composite obstacles. The slopes of the trend lines are both negative and 
significant  at  the  5%  level.  These  graphs  further  confirm  the  hypothesis  that  the  relation 
between firm performance and governance is negatively associated with predation. 
 
 
                                                 
28 The test is performed by running joint-sample regressions using all independent variables and their 
interactions  with  a  low  predation  dummy  variable.  The  dummy  variable  takes  a  value  of  one  for 
observations that belong to the low-predation subsample, and zero otherwise.   29 
D.  What Factors Explain Variation in Governance?  
In this section, we test Prediction 4, which states that firm governance is less sensitive to firm 
and  industry  characteristics  in  more  predatory  countries;  that  is,  firms  have  more  similar 
governance  structures  in  such  countries.  Doidge,  Karolyi,  and  Stulz  (2006)  argue  that  the 
beneficial  effects  of  governance  and  transparency  are  lower  in  states  with  less  developed 
financial markets. They show that firm and industry characteristics explain a very small part of 
variation in governance and transparency in such markets. More predatory states, in turn, are 
less financially developed.29 We therefore contend that state predation can be a complementary 
story to Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2006) in explaining why firm factors play a small role in 
defining firm governance.  
To test this conjecture, we identify four governance and transparency determinants for the 
CLSA, S&P, and ISS samples. They are: growth opportunities, industry dependence on external 
financing,  firm  size,  and  firm  cash.30  For  the  WBES  sample,  the  determinants  are:  firm 
assessment  of  laws  and  regulations,  firm  size,  and  foreign  ownership.  Similar  to  the 
governance-performance analysis, we test Prediction 4 by including the interaction terms of 
governance with its determinants, splitting the sample according to high- and low-predation 
countries, and, then running country-specific regressions.  
Table  XI  examines  whether  the  sensitivities  of  firm  governance  to  firm  and  industry 
characteristics are lower in more predatory states. As in Table VI, predation negatively affects 
CLSA governance, S&P transparency, and ISS governance. Higher predation accompanied with 
a  greater  dependence  on  external  financing  and  larger  firm  size  negatively  impacts  CLSA 
governance.  This  confirms  the  hypothesis  that  the  positive  impact  of  firm  and  industry 
characteristics is less crucial to shaping firm governance in more predatory countries. However, 
as in the case with predation, where the individual determinants lose significance, larger firms 
with  greater  growth  opportunities  and  more  dependence  on  external  financing  in  more 
autocratic states are significantly associated with lower CLSA governance scores. 
The results for the interaction terms affecting S&P transparency are fairly similar to the 
CLSA governance scores. Larger firms with greater growth opportunities and more dependence 
on external financing in countries with more predatory government are less transparent. The 
sensitivity of autocracy combined with the firm and industry characteristics have no effect on 
transparency as is evident by the lack of significance of the interaction terms with autocracy.  
                                                 
29 The correlation between the predation index and financial development variable is -0.630 (p-value = 
0.00). 
30 The reported results do not change if we include ownership concentration in these regressions.   30 
As  in  the  case  with  CLSA  governance  as  the  dependent  variable,  higher  predation 
accompanied with greater dependence on external financing and firm size negatively affects ISS 
governance. The same firm and industry characteristics (growth opportunities, dependence on 
external  financing,  and  size)  interacted  with  autocracy  negatively  affect  ISS  governance, 
consistent with the CLSA governance scores.  
Panel B (the WBES sample) illustrates that better assessment of laws and regulation and 
larger firms in states with greater obstacles (corruption, tax and regulation, and crime) are less 
likely to have audited financial statements.31  
In Table XII, we divide the sample into low- and high-predation, autocracy, and composite 
obstacles countries and run similar regressions to Table XI. If firm and industry characteristics 
matter less in high-predation, autocracy, and obstacle countries, we should detect at most a 
weak relation between firm and industry characteristics and governance in the top quartile 
subsamples. As in Table IX, we do not include the ISS sample in this table because the top and 
bottom quartiles of the sample contain firms from just one country.  
We notice from Panel A of Table XII that there are substantial differences in the coefficients 
between the high- and low-predation, high- and low-autocracy, and high- and low-composite 
obstacles index countries. We again detect most of the same signs and significance on firm 
determinants  in  the  low-predation  and  low-autocracy  subsamples.  The  coefficients  on  the 
governance determinants in the low-predation subsample are statistically different from the 
coefficients  in  the  high-predation  and  governance  subsamples.  Firms  with  greater  growth 
opportunities in low-predation countries have higher CLSA governance scores, and firms in 
low-autocracy  states  have  higher  CLSA  governance  scores  and  S&P  transparency  rankings. 
Dependence on external financing is significantly negatively related to CLSA governance and 
S&P  transparency  in  only  low-predation  and  low-autocratic  countries.  A  negative  and 
significant  relation  holds  between  cash  holdings  and  both  CLSA  governance  and  S&P 
transparency in low-predation and autocracy subsamples.  
For the low- and high-composite obstacles index subsamples (Panel B of Table XII), a similar 
pattern (that is, a positive relation) obtains for firm size on the WBES audit dummy. Better laws 
and regulation, as well as a greater fraction of foreign ownership, have a positive effect on the 
WBES  audit  dummy  dependent  variable,  but  only  for  low-obstacle  firms.  The  regression 
coefficients in the low-obstacle subsample are jointly significantly different from the coefficients 
                                                 
31  The  results  remain  unchanged  if  we  control  for  the  interaction  between  governance  determinants 
(growth  opportunities,  dependence  on  external  financing)  and  the  quality  of  the  legal  environment 
(investor protection and rule of law indexes) as in Durnev and Kim (2005).   31 
in  the  high-obstacle  subsample.  Overall,  our  findings  confirm  the  hypothesis  that  firm  and 
industry characteristics matter more in low-predation, autocracy, and obstacles countries. These 
are  the  firms  that  have  the  most  incentive  to  practice  better  governance  and  become  more 
transparent.  
As in Table X, we run country-by-country regressions for Table XIII and report coefficients 
and p-values on growth opportunities, dependence on external financing, and size for the ISS 
sample (Panel A) and laws and regulations, firm size, and foreign ownership for the WBES 
sample (Panel B). The country regressions include all of the other firm and industry control 
variables mentioned earlier and utilized in the Table VI regressions. 
The ISS governance sample contains only developed countries and we notice that growth 
opportunities significantly affect ISS governance in 10 out of the 23 countries contained in the 
data  set.  All  but  one  of  the  significant  coefficients  is  positive.  The  negative  and  significant 
coefficient corresponds to France, where the predation index is relatively higher than in almost 
all of the other countries. We notice a similar pattern for the size of the firm on ISS governance, 
but the negative and significant coefficient now corresponds to Japan. None of the coefficients 
on the dependence on external financing are significant. 
Panel B of Table XIII reports the countries for the WBES data set. It appears that a better firm 
assessment  of  laws  and  regulations  doesn’t  always  translate  into  a  firm  choosing  audited 
financial statements. We also uncover that in the majority of countries, larger firms and firms 
with greater foreign ownership have audited financial statements. The pattern of signs of the 
coefficients is also revealing. Most of the positive and significant coefficients appear at the top 
half of the table, the part containing countries that score low on predation and autocracy. This is 
also evident from Figure 4. 
Panel A of Figure 4 plots the coefficients on growth opportunities and size against predation 
for  the  ISS  governance  sample.  We  detect  that  the  growth  opportunity  sensitivities  are 
negatively related to predation. The coefficient on the trend line is negative and significant at 
the 5% level. The relation between size sensitivity and predation is negative, but the trend-line 
coefficient is insignificant. Panel B plots the coefficients on law and regulation, firm size, and 
foreign ownership for the WBES data set against the composite obstacles. The slopes of the lines 
are  negative  and  are  all  significant  at  the  5%  level.  Taken  together,  the  firm  and  industry 
variables show a weaker relation to governance and transparency in more predatory countries. 
The  second  part  of  Prediction  4  states  that,  all  else  equal,  within-country  variability  in 
governance  is  lower  in  more  predatory  states.  In  Table  XIV,  we  report  the  results  of  OLS   32 
regressions of governance variability (defined at the firm level) on predation and autocracy for 
the CLSA, S&P, and ISS samples, and on the composite obstacles index for the WBES sample. In 
these regressions we control for relevant firm, industry, and country variables. We define firm 
variability in governance as the absolute values of the residuals of firm governance obtained 
from the regressions in Table VI, omitting predation, autocracy, and composite obstacles. These 
residuals can be interpreted as the variation in governance conditional on firm and industry 
characteristics. 
What we  observe  from the  table  is that the coefficients  on  predation  and  autocracy  are 
negative and significant across all of the specifications for the CLSA, S&P, and ISS samples 
(Panel A). In addition, the coefficient on the composite obstacles is negative and significant for 
the  WBES  sample  (Panel  B).  These  results  confirm  our  conjecture  that  firms  exhibit  less 
variability in governance in more predatory countries. 
 
VI. Robustness 
In our main analyses, we test our hypotheses using four distinct data sets. The results are 
persuasive across all four of them. Nonetheless, we check the robustness of our findings to 
endogeneity,  errors-in-variables,  sample  selection,  and  outliers.  We  also  include  additional 
control variables in our regressions.  
 
A. Endogeneity 
In governance studies, it is often difficult to draw inferences from an observed association 
among  country  variables,  corporate  governance,  and  performance  due  to  various  statistical 
problems  such  as  endogeneity,  errors-in-variables,  and  sample  selection.  First,  government 
predation  policies  might  be  endogenous  to  the  quality  of  the  legal  regime  and  the level  of 
economic development, and thus to firm governance structure and firm performance. Hall and 
Jones (1999) also point out that predation can only be measured with noise, creating an errors-
in-variables problem and potentially biasing one’s empirical results. Second, unobservable firm 
characteristics  (for  example,  managerial  ability)  and  other  factors  may  affect  both  firm 
performance  and  the  firm’s  choice  of  corporate  governance.  Thus,  the  regressions  of  firm 
governance on firm characteristics and of firm performance on governance suffer from the well-
known statistical problem whereby the regression error terms and independent variables are 
correlated. Such regression results would not readily lead to a reliable conclusion about the link   33 
between predation, governance, and performance. We address these two types of endogeneity 
in this subsection.  
First, we use language, distance from the equator, and openness of the economy variables 
(described in Table I) as instruments for the predation index and its interaction terms with firm 
governance (see Hall and Jones (1999)).32 The first instrument is the Western European (French, 
German, Portuguese, and Spanish) language dummy. The belief is that countries in which a 
substantial part of the population speaks one of the European languages were more likely to 
establish  a  system  of  checks  and  balances  that  limit  government  predatory  policies.  The 
European influence is also stronger where people settled sparsely at the beginning of the 16th 
century, such as the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Argentina. We account 
for this factor by using distance from the equator as an instrument. Finally, trade share is used 
as  an  instrument  because  businesses  in  more  open  countries  likely  lobby  for  pro-business 
regulations.33  
In Table XV, we rerun our main determinants-of-governance and governance-performance 
regressions (using all four samples) using the instrumental variables described above for the 
predation index and the interaction terms of predation with the governance indicators. The 
results are reported in Table XV. Panel A contains the determinants-of-governance regressions, 
an abbreviated version of Table VIII.34 It is evident that, with the instrumental variables, the 
results described earlier become generally stronger. In more predatory states, firms practice 
worse  governance  and  disclose  less.  The  performance  regression  results  (Panel  B)  are  also 
robust to earlier findings that suggest firms in more predatory states are valued lower and the 
valuation effect of good governance is lessened in more predatory states (except for the ISS 
sample).35  
We follow Himmelberg et al. (1999) to tackle the second source of endogeneity. We assume 
the presence of unobserved firm fixed effects and eliminate them by estimating our regressions 
with  all  the  variables  expressed  in  differences.  The  remaining  endogeneity  is  reduced  by 
instrumenting  contemporaneous  differences  by  past  levels  of  independent  variables  (see 
                                                 
32 Hall and Jones (1999) discuss how this approach addresses both the endogeneity of predation and the 
errors-in-variables problem due to measurement noise. 
33 The results remain unchanged if we use the settler mortality rates of European Bishops, soldiers, and 
sailors stationed in colonies in the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries as an instrument (see Acemoglu, Johnson, 
and Robinson (2001) and Claessens and Laeven (2003)). 
34 We do not instrument the interaction terms of firm characteristics with predation as there are not 
enough instrumental variables for the determinants-of-governance equation to be identified. 
35 At the bottom of Table XV, we report the results of the Durbin-Hausman-Wu test for endogeneity. The 
tests indicate that predation variables are endogenous.    34 
Wooldridge (2001) for the description of this method). In these regressions, we utilize the panel 
structure of the CLSA, S&P, and ISS data sets.36 The results of estimation in differences appear 
in Table XVI. The coefficient on predation drops out because there is very little intertemporal 
variation in this variable across countries. The results presented provide weaker support for the 
hypothesis that firm characteristics matter less in shaping firm governance in more predatory 
countries  (Panel  A).37  We  suspect  that  some  of  the  coefficients  become  insignificant  due  to 
insufficient intertemporal variation in the independent variables in the relatively small sample. 
The regression results for performance on governance are more reassuring (Panel B). Firms that 
show a larger improvement in governance also experience a significant increase in valuation. 
The positive valuation effect of sounder governance is, again, weaker in more predatory states. 
Thus,  we  generally  conclude  that  using  geographical  and  linguistic  instruments  for  the 
predation index, as well as estimating some of the regressions in differences, does not overturn 
our main results.  
 
B. Sample Selection 
The results may also be biased because of the sample selection problem. For example, firms 
are included in the CLSA, S&P, and ISS samples because of their size or because they are part of 
a  major  international  stock  index.  We  address  this  by  estimating  all  regressions  using  the 
Heckman  (1979)  two-step  selection  model,  which  provides  consistent  and  asymptotically 
efficient  coefficient  estimates.  According  to  the  Heckman  selection  model,  a  data  point  is 
observed if γ * Sizej + uj > 0, where Sizej is firm size, γ is the selection equation coefficient, and uj 
is the error term. To estimate the selection regression, we use the entire universe of companies 
in the Worldscope database (over 20,000 firms). We find similar patterns in the magnitudes and 
significance levels of the coefficients reported in the tables. 
 
C. Additional Controls 
Private businesses can guard themselves from predatory government policies by becoming 
more indispensable to the states. This can be achieved by using more tangible assets, seeking 
greater  internationalization,  securing  higher  levels  of  short-term  debt,  and  hiring  more 
employees. Although these issues are investigated in a separate project, we nonetheless control 
for some of them (for the CLSA, S&P, and ISS samples) here to check that our results are not 
                                                 
36 The WBES sample is not used for these tests because it is available only for one year. 
37 We omit dependence of external financing from the determinants-of-governance regression because we 
cannot calculate its lagged value.   35 
driven by these factors. To save space we briefly describe the results without reporting the 
regressions.  
Fixed assets are harder to expropriate by managers and governments (Claessens and Laeven 
(2003);  Klapper  and  Love  (2004)).  This  can  affect  the  relation  between  governance,  state 
expropriation, and valuation. We define fixed assets as the past ratio of property, plant, and 
equipment  to  sales. Across  most  of  the  specifications,  we  observe  that  firms  with  a  greater 
proportion  of  fixed  assets  score  higher  on  governance.  Moreover,  in  the  governance-
performance  regressions,  the  interaction  term  of  predation  with  fixed  assets  is  positive, 
indicating that the negative impact of predation is lessened for firms with more tangible assets.  
The existing literature discusses how international exposure through, for example, cross-
listing  and  joint  international  ventures  helps  companies  signal  their  intentions  to  practice 
better  governance  to  the  market  (Khanna,  Kogan,  and  Palepu  (2002)).  Moreover,  when 
shareholder  rights  are violated,  investors  can  file  claims  in  international  rather  than  local 
courts  (Doidge,  Karolyi,  and  Stulz  (2003);  Siegel  (2005)).  Although  we  already  control  for 
cross-listing (the CLSA, S&P, and ISS samples) and foreign ownership (the WBES sample), we 
include exports (the past value of export revenues over sales) in all of the regressions. This 
variable and its interaction with predation turn out to be insignificant across most of the 
tables.  
Companies  can  also  alter  their  capital  structure  to  elude  government  capture.  It  is 
established that debt rather than equity, and in particular short-term debt, is a main source of 
financing in developing countries (see, for example, Harvey, Lins, and Roper (2004) and Fan, 
Titman, and Twite (2005)).38 Short-term debt can serve not only as a monitoring device but also 
as an instrument to make state capture costlier (Stulz (2005)). Consequently, we control for the 
level of short-term debt (past ratio of short-term debt to sales). In most of the specifications this 
variable and its interaction term with governance turn out insignificant. 
Firms  that  employ  more  workers  would  presumably  suffer  less  from  government 
interference because unemployment-conscious governments are less likely to bring a firm to 
bankruptcy.  We control for employment by the past ratio of the number of employees to sales. 
Although this variable is by itself insignificant, as is the case with fixed assets its interaction 
with predation is negative and significant in the valuation regressions.  
                                                 
38  Harvey,  Lins,  and  Roper  (2004)  provide  evidence  that  debt  creates  shareholder  value  in  emerging 
economies because higher debt levels reduce the agency costs associated with overinvestment.   36 
In the WBES sample, we also form an interaction term of state ownership (this variable is 
not available for the CLSA, S&P, and ISS samples) with audit.  It appears that obstacles imposed 
by governments matter less for companies with greater government ownership. We observe 
this with the positive and significant coefficient on the interaction term between the composite 
obstacles  index  and  government  ownership  in  the  performance  regressions.39  We  generally 
conclude that none of our previously reported results changes with these additional controls 
(fixed assets, exports, short-term debt, employment, government ownership). 
 
D. Outliers  
Outliers can potentially affect our findings. We use the method proposed by Hadi (1994) to 
detect and drop outliers. In addition, all regressions are re-estimated after winsorizing the main 
variables at the 1% and 99% levels. None of these procedures changes our conclusions. Our 
results  also  hold  if  we  repeat  the  analyses  after  omitting  U.S.  firms  from  the  S&P  and  ISS 
samples  on  the  grounds  that  they  comprise  32%  and  70%  of  these  samples,  respectively. 
Accounting data for financial and banking industries are not directly comparable with those 
from other industries. When we eliminate the financial industries (SIC codes 6000-6999), the 
sample size is reduced by 10%. The main results, however, remain robust.  
 
VII. Conclusions 
In  this  paper,  we  propose  a  model  of  corporate  governance  and  government  predation 
whereby both states and managers can expropriate resources from the firm. According to this 
model,  diversion  by  managers  and  expropriation  by  states  are  complements.  The  model 
predicts that managers have greater incentives to divert resources from the firm when the risk 
of  government  expropriation  is  higher.  Intuitively,  it  is  harder  for  the  government  to 
expropriate  from  the  firm  when  the  manager  has  already  diverted  profits  without  the 
knowledge of the owners and minority shareholders.  
Firm  governance  will  be  weaker  (all  else  equal)  when  owners  incentivize  managers  to 
deviate from profit maximization. Firm owners benefit from weaker governance because less 
money will be available for the government to expropriate. Therefore, we predict that firms 
conducting business in countries with more predatory governments have lower incentives to 
                                                 
39 The results also survive the inclusion of additional variables and alternative definitions of the variables 
already described in the text (ownership concentration, firm-level measure of external financing needs, 
corporate  tax  burden,  R&D  expenses,  and  quality  of  legal  environment),  with  the  pattern  of  the 
regression coefficients and their significance similar to those reported.   37 
practice good governance. Moreover, the positive valuation effect of better firm governance is 
generally weaker when firms operate in business-nonfriendly environments.  
We test our model predictions using several comprehensive data sets on international firm 
governance and transparency. The first data set is CLSA’s 2000-2001 Governance Indicators. The 
second  is  S&P’s  1997-2002  Transparency  Rankings.  The  third  data  set  is  ISS’  2003-2006 
International Corporate Governance Quotients. Some of the econometric problems are overcome by 
using firm-level data on firms’ perception of obstacles imposed by government policies (World 
Business Environment Survey).   
The empirical results support our model’s predictions. Firms located in countries with states 
likely to expropriate firm assets practice weaker governance and disclose less information. The 
positive valuation effect of sounder governance is weaker or non-existent in more predatory 
states. We also observe that the governance structure of firms is more similar in such countries. 
This  provides  further  evidence  that  firm-specific  factors  play  a  smaller  role  in  determining 
differences in the formation of governance when states are predatory.  
 We show that government predation aggravates firm governance problems. When states 
pursue predatory policies, firm governance will likely not improve. Investors need to be aware 
that stricter securities laws may not be enough for firms to enhance their governance standards 
unless  countries  improve  their  policies  towards  businesses  by  respecting  property  rights, 
fighting corruption, and reducing crime.    38 
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Table I  
Variables, definitions, and sources 
 
Variables  Definitions  Sources 
 
CLSA, S&P, and ISS 
samples 




CLSA governance is defined as 0.15 multiplied by the sum of six factors: (i) managerial incentives and discipline towards 
value-maximizing actions (9 attributes); (ii) timeliness and accuracy of financial information disclosure (10 attributes); (iii) 
board independence (7 attributes); (iv) board accountability (8 attributes); (v) enforcement and management accountability 
(6 attributes); and (vi) minority shareholder protection (10 attributes). Refer to Appendix A for a detailed description of 
individual attributes. Data frequency is annual from 2000 through 2001. The variable ranges from 0 through 90. Larger 
values indicate better governance.  
 
 
2000 and 2001 CLSA 




S&P transparency is defined as the number of items disclosed in a firm’s financial statements. The items are grouped into 
three  categories:  (i)  ownership  structure  and  investor  relations  (22  items);  (ii)  accounting  and financial information  (33 
items); and (iii) board and management structure (35 items). Refer to Appendix B for a detailed description of individual 
items. Data frequency is annual from 1997 through 2002. The variable ranges from 0 through 91. Larger values indicate 
more disclosed items. 
 
 
1997-2002 S&P Transparency 





ISS governance is defined as the percentage of 44 governance attributes for which a firm meets or exceeds the minimum 
satisfactory standards. The attributes are grouped into four sub-categories: (i) board (25 attributes); (ii) audit (3 attributes); 
(iii) anti-takeover (6 attributes); and (iv) compensation and ownership (10 attributes). Refer to Appendix C for a detailed 
description of individual attributes. Data frequency is annual from 204 through 2005. The variable ranges from 1 through 44. 





Governance Quotients  
 
WBES obstacles sample 




Performance is measured as predicted future (one year) percentage change in sales. This variable is available for 2000. 
 
 
Firm size  
 
This variable takes a value of 1 (small) if a company employs at least 50 workers; 2 (medium) if a company employs more 












This is an indicator variable for the following sectors: manufacturing, services, agriculture, construction, and other. This 

























The World Bank’s 2000 World 
Business Environment Survey 
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Laws and regulations 
 
Laws and regulations are calculated as the sum of three components: (i) availability of laws and regulations; (ii) predictability 
of laws and regulations; and (iii) confidence in current judicial system. The score is cumulative and based on the answers to 
the following three questions: (i) "In general, information on the laws and regulations affecting my firm is easy to obtain" 
(The possible answers are: 1. Fully disagree; 2. Disagree in most cases; 3. Tend to disagree; 4. Tend to agree; 5. Agree in 
most cases; and 6. Fully agree); (ii) "In general, interpretations of laws and regulations affecting my firm are consistent and 
predictable" (1. Fully disagree; 2. Disagree in most cases; 3. Tend to disagree; 4. Tend to agree; 5. Agree in most cases; 
and 6. Fully agree); and (iii) “In resolving business disputes, do you believe your country's court system?” (1. Never; 2. 
Seldom; 3. Sometimes; 4. Frequently; 5. Usually; and 6. Always). This variable is available for 2000 and it ranges from 3 





Corruption-based obstacles are defined as the answer to the following question: “Please judge on a four-point scale, where 
"4" means a major obstacle, "3" means a moderate obstacle, "2" means a minor obstacle, and "1" means it is no obstacle, 
how problematic corruption is for the operation and growth of your business?” This variable is available for 2000 and it 




Taxes and regulation 
obstacle 
 
Tax and regulation-based obstacles are defined as the answer to the following question: “Please judge on a four-point 
scale, where "4" means a major obstacle, "3" means a moderate obstacle, "2" means a minor obstacle, and "1" means it is 
no obstacle, how problematic taxes and regulation are for the operation and growth of your business?” This variable is 





Crime-related obstacles are defined as the answer to the following question: “Please judge on a four-point scale, where "4" 
means a major obstacle, "3" means a moderate obstacle, "2" means a minor obstacle, and "1" means it is no obstacle, how 
problematic organized crime and mafia are for the operation and growth of your business?” This variable is available for 






The composite obstacles index is defined as the sum of the crime, tax and regulation, and corruption obstacles. This 
variable is available for 2000 and it ranges from 3 to 12. Larger values indicate greater composite obstacles.   
 
 
Predation and autocracy 




Corruption is defined as the degree to which corruption distorts economic and financial environment, reducing the efficiency 
of government and business by enabling people to assume positions of power through patronage rather than ability. Data 
frequency is annual from 1996 through 2005. This variable ranges from 1 through 6. Larger values indicate more corruption. 
 
 
Risk of government 
expropriation 
 
Risk of government expropriation measures country-specific risk of expropriation by governments based on a business 
environment ranking that quantifies the attractiveness of the business environment. Data frequency is annual from 1996 




Country Risk Guide 
 
Lack of property rights 
protection 
 
Lack of property rights protection measures the degree of property rights protection in a country. Data frequency is annual 





Government stance towards business measures the country-level assessment of the likelihood that the current government 
will implement unliberal and business-unfriendly policies. Data frequency is annual from 1996 through 2004. This variable 
ranges from 1 through 5. Larger values indicate less business-friendly governments. 
 
 
Freedom to compete 
 
Freedom to compete measures the country assessment of government policies towards establishing a free competitive 
environment. Data frequency is annual from 1996 through 2004. This variable ranges from 1 through 5. Larger values 
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Quality of bureaucracy 
 
Quality of bureaucracy quantifies whether bureaucracy impedes fair business practices in a country. Data frequency is 
annual from 1996 through 2004. This variable ranges from 1 through 5. Larger values indicate worse bureaucracy quality. 
 
 
Impact of crime 
 
Impact of crime measures whether violent crime is a problem for government and business. Data frequency is annual from 





Predation is defined as the sum of seven indexes: (i) corruption; (ii) risk of government expropriation; (iii) lack of property 
rights protection; (iv) government stance towards business; (v) freedom to compete; (vi) quality of bureaucracy; and (vii) 
impact of crime. Data frequency is annual from 1996 through 2004. This variable ranges from 7 through 36. Larger numbers 





Autocracy  is  defined  as  the  autocracy  index  plus  two  times  the  government  instability  index.  The  autocracy  index  is 
calculated  as  POLITY’s  “autocratic  government”  variable  minus  POLITY’s  “democratic  government”  variable.  The 
“autocratic government” variable measures general closedness of political institutions. The “democratic government” index 
measures  general  openness  of  political  institutions.  Government  stability  is  the  International  Country  Risk  Guide’s 
assessment of the government's ability to stay in office and carry out its declared program(s), depending upon such factors 
as the type of governance, cohesion of the government and governing parties, approach of an election, and command of 
the legislature. Data frequency is annual from 1996 through 2004. This variable ranges from 2 through 44. Larger values 





POLITY IV and 1996-2004 








Anti-self dealing is an index of legal rules and private enforcement mechanisms, such as disclosure, approval, and litigation, 
governing a specific self-dealing transaction based on ex-ante and ex-post control of self-dealing. This variable ranges from 




Djankov, La Porta, and Shleifer 
(2006) 
 
GDP per capita 
 
GDP per capita is defined as Gross Domestic Product per capita in real U.S. dollars. Data frequency is annual from 1996 





Financial development is defined as total market capitalization of listed companies in a country scaled by Gross Domestic 





Inflation is defined as the logarithm of one plus the rate of inflation in 2000. 
 
1996-2004 The World Bank’s 
World Economic Indicators 
 
Black market  
 
Black market measures the extent to which a parallel (black-market, unrecorded) economy impairs economic development. 
Data frequency is annual from 1996 through 2004. This variable ranges from 0 through 10. Larger values indicate more 






Freedom of press 
 
Freedom of press is the assessment of the state of press freedom in a country based on 50 criteria. It includes every kind of 
violation  directly  affecting  journalists  (such  as  murders,  imprisonment,  physical  attacks,  and  threats)  and  news  media 
(censorship, confiscation of issues, searches, and harassment). Data frequency is annual from 2000 through 2004. This 
variable ranges from 0 through 50.  Larger values indicate more oppressed press. 
 
 





Investor protection is an aggregate index of shareholder rights. It is defined as the sum of six items: (i) the country allows 
shareholders to mail their proxy vote to the firm; (ii) shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to the general 
shareholders’ meeting; (iii) cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities mechanism is in place; (iv) an 
oppressed minorities mechanism is in place; (v) rules explicitly mandate or set as a default rule that shareholders hold the 
first opportunity to buy new issues of stock; and (vi) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to 
call for an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting is less than or equal to ten percent. This variable ranges from 0 through 6. 
Larger values indicate better protection of investor rights. 
 
 
Djankov, La Porta, and Shleifer 
(2006) 
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Rule of law 
 
Rule of law is the assessment of the law and order tradition of the country, based on two sub-components. The law sub-
component assesses the strength and impartiality of the legal system, and the order sub-component assesses popular 
observance of the law. Data frequency is annual from 1997 through 2006. This variable ranges from 0 through 10. Larger 




Country Risk Guide  
 
Corporate tax burden 
 
Corporate tax burden is the assessment of how corporate taxation impedes the development of private businesses. Data 








   
 
Distance from the equator 
 
Distance from the equator is defined for each country as the absolute value of latitude (in degrees) divided by 90. This 
variable ranges from 0 through 1. Larger numbers indicate further distance from the equator. 
 
 





Western  European  language  dummy  takes  a  value  of  1  for  countries  where  a  Western  European  language  (French, 






Trade  share  is  defined  as  the  logarithm  of  the  predicted  trade  share  of  an  economy,  based  on  a  gravity  model  of 
international trade that uses a country's population and geographical features. This variable ranges from 0 to 1. Larger 
values indicate a greater trade share. 
 
Frankel and Romer (1996) 
 
Firm and industry 
variables 




Valuation is measured by Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q is defined as the sum of total assets plus market value of common stock less 
book value of equity over total assets. The market value of equity is the number of common shares outstanding times the 
year-end price. This variable is winsorized at the 1
st and 99







Growth opportunities are measured as the lagged growth rate in net sales. This variable is winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th 




Industry dependence on 
external finance 
 
Industry  dependence  on  external  financing  is  defined  as  industry  average  capital  expenditures minus cash  flows from 
operations divided by capital expenditures. The variable for non-U.S. firms is computed using data on capital expenditures 
and cash flows for firms from the same 4-digit SIC industry in the U.S. See Rajan and Zingales (1998) for details. U.S. firm 



















Cross-listing dummy is equal to 1 if the firm's shares are listed on a U.S. exchange, and 0 otherwise. Privately placed ADRs 
through Rule 144a and over-the-counter stocks are excluded. Data frequency is annual from 1996 through 2004. 
 




Industries are grouped across 2-digit SICs. They are: petroleum (SIC 13, 29), consumer durables (SIC 30, 36, 37, 50, 55, 
57), basic industry (SIC 8, 10, 12, 14, 24, 26, 28, 33), food and tobacco (SIC 20, 21, 54), construction (SIC 15, 16, 17, 32), 
capital goods (SIC 34, 35, 38, 39), transportation (SIC 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 47), textiles and trade (SIC 22, 23, 51, 53, 56, 59), 









Ownership concentration is defined as the lagged cumulative percentage of shares held by insiders (closed-held shares), 
which include senior corporate officers and directors and their immediate families, shares held in trusts, shares held by 
another corporation (except shares held in a fiduciary capacity by financial institutions), shares held by pension/benefit 
plans, and shares held by individuals who hold five percent or more of shares outstanding. In Japan, closely-held shares 
represent the holdings of the ten largest shareholders. For firms with more than one class of shares, closely-held shares for 
each class are added together. Data frequency is annual from 1996 through 2004. 
 
 
Firm dependence on 
external finance 
 
Firm dependence on external financing is defined as the lagged difference between the growth rate in total assets less the 
maximum sustainable growth rate, where the latter is equal to ROE / (1 - ROE), and ROE is the return on equity (see 
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Table II 
CLSA, S&P, and ISS samples 
 
This table reports summary statistics (averages) for the CLSA, S&P, and ISS samples by country. Countries are sorted by GDP per capita in 2000. CLSA governance is either for 2000 or 2001. S&P transparency is 










































India  $459   49.62  83  29.36  42  -  -  4  2  3  3  3  4  2  21  7  0.55 
Pakistan  $516   27.83  11  29.04  11  -  -  5  2  3  4  3  4  3  24  13  0.41 
China  $824   40.90  49  41.78  17  -  -  6  3  4  3  3  4  3  26  17  0.78 
Indonesia  $994   33.48  21  30.02  14  -  -  6  3  3  4  3  4  3  26  11  0.68 
Philippines  $1,167   36.80  21  24.70  9  -  -  5  1  2  3  3  4  4  22  15  0.24 
Columbia  $2,290   44.62  1  15.00  1  -  -  5  2  3  2  2  3  5  22  9  0.58 
Peru  $2,368   67.68  1  21.09  8  -  -  3  2  3  3  2  3  4  20  6  0.41 
Russia  $2,455   39.05  3  33.24  42  -  -  6  3  3  4  3  5  5  29  5  0.48 
Thailand  $2,805   50.45  25  37.09  28  -  -  5  1  1  3  2  3  3  18  5  0.85 
Turkey  $3,134   33.48  20  -  -  -  -  4  2  2  2  3  4  3  20  7  0.43 
Venezuela  $3,300   -  -  24.17  2  -  -  4  2  4  3  3  4  4  24  5  0.09 
Mexico  $3,819   52.03  14  21.90  18  -  -  3  2  3  3  2  3  4  20  4  0.18 
South Africa  $3,985   61.72  45  -  -  -  -  4  1  1  4  3  3  5  21  5  0.81 
Poland  $4,223   30.11  7  -  -  -  -  4  1  2  2  2  3  3  17  9  0.30 
Brazil  $4,624   52.71  36  24.04  30  -  -  4  2  3  3  3  3  4  22  6  0.29 
Malaysia  $4,797   53.14  47  37.60  51  -  -  4  2  2  3  3  2  2  18  9  0.95 
Czech 
Republic  $5,311   30.89  3  -  -  -  -  3  1  2  2  2  4  3  17  10  0.34 
Chile  $5,354   56.18  18  29.42  21  -  -  3  1  1  1  1  2  3  12  3  0.63 
Hungary  $5,425   42.17  3  -  -  -  -  3  1  2  2  2  3  3  16  7  0.20 
Argentina  $7,933   52.99  2  23.94  9  -  -  4  2  2  3  3  3  3  20  6  0.44 
Portugal  $12,794   -  -  44.71  7  49.74  14  2  1  1  2  2  4  2  14  2  0.49 
Korea  $13,062   46.44  36  34.17  48  -  -  4  1  1  2  3  2  2  15  8  0.46 
Greece  $13,105   52.11  2  34.75  2  58.83  44  2  1  2  2  3  4  2  16  19  0.25 
Taiwan  $13,953   48.91  60  20.17  39  -  -  5  1  1  2  2  2  2  15  7  0.56 
Israel  $17,067   18.72  5  -  -  -  -  4  1  2  2  2  3  2  16  10  0.71 
New 
Zealand  $17,548   -  -  51.0  1  53.61  54  2  1  1  1  2  1  2  10  4  0.95 
Spain  $17,798   -  -  43.99  17  49.31  18  3  1  2  2  2  3  2  15  2  0.37 
Italy  $20,885   -  -  45.98  28  51.11  71  4  1  2  2  2  4  4  19  4  0.39 
U.K.  $21,667   -  -  58.59  139  66.28  168  2  1  1  1  1  1  2  9  2  0.93 
Canada  $22,541   -  -  -  -  56.81  530  5  2  3  2  2  3  5  10  2  0.65 
Australia  $23,838   -  -  56.69  26  50.87  119  2  1  1  1  2  1  2  10  2  0.59 
Hong Kong  $24,218   56.56  46  39.71  43  54.89  110  4  2  1  1  1  1  2  12  2  0.96 
Ireland  $27,741   -  -  58.70  5  51.52  67  5  1  1  2  2  2  2  15  4  0.68 
Singapore  $28,230   58.83  47  48.22  27  55.98  16  3  1  1  2  1  1  1  10  14  1.00 
France  $29,811   -  -  54.48  47  55.68  83  4  1  1  2  2  3  2  15  7  0.85   49 
Belgium  $30,830   -  -  50.50  8  54.10  43  3  1  1  2  2  3  2  14  4  0.54 
Netherlands  $30,967   -  -  47.39  27  48.15  25  1  1  1  2  2  2  2  11  2  0.21 
Sweden  $31,206   -  -  51.74  18  57.28  47  1  1  1  1  2  2  1  9  4  0.34 
U.S.  $31,996   -  -  68.56  485  60.04  5,296  3  1  1  1  1  2  3  12  6  0.65 
Finland  $32,024   -  -  54.40  5  66.82  31  1  1  1  2  2  2  1  10  4  0.46 
Germany  $32,623   -  -  43.72  36  58.24  85  3  1  1  2  2  2  2  13  2  0.28 
Austria  $32,763   -  -  42.83  2  57.81  19  3  1  1  2  2  2  1  12  6  0.21 
Norway  $37,954   -  -  43.13  4  54.01  21  2  1  1  2  2  2  1  11  4  0.44 
Denmark  $38,521   -  -  41.53  6  58.07  22  1  1  2  2  2  2  1  11  4  0.47 
Japan  $44,830   -  -  45.36  150  54.69  589  4  1  1  2  2  2  1  13  6  0.48 
Switzerland  $46,737   -  -  40.15  20  61.75  58  2  1  1  2  2  1  1  10  4  0.27 
 Average  $16,532   45.50  
Total: 
606 
24.24   39.56  
Total: 
1,493 
38.28   55.89  
Total: 
7,530 
327.39   3.48   1.39   1.78   2.24   2.20   2.72   2.59   16.13   6.39   0.52    50 
  Table III 
Correlation coefficients, CLSA, S&P, and ISS samples 
 
This table reports the correlation coefficients between the main variables for the CLSA, S&P, and ISS samples. The CLSA sample is either for 2000 or 2001. S&P transparency is either for 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, or 
2001. ISS governance is for December 2005. All of the other variables are for 2000. Numbers in parentheses are probability levels at which the hypothesis of zero correlation can be rejected. The coefficients 














transparency  Valuation 
GDP per 














crime  Predation  Autocracy 
ISS governance  -0.060 
 
                       
  (0.58) 
 
                       
S&P transparency  0.172  0.143                         
  (0.00)  (0.00)                         
Valuation  0.189 
0.000 
0.178                       
  (0.00) 
(0.99) 
(0.00)                       
GDP per capita  0.289 
-0.002 
0.563  -0.031                     
  (0.00) 
(0.84) 
(0.00)  (0.49)                     
Corruption  -0.371 
-0.095 
-0.489  -0.011  -0.492                   
  (0.00) 
(0.00) 
(0.00)  (0.79)  (0.00)                   
Risk of expropriation  -0.231 
-0.056 
-0.495  0.024  -0.363  0.483                 
  (0.00) 
(0.00) 
(0.00)  (0.57)  (0.00)  (0.00)                 
-0.316 
-0.083 
-0.534  0.023  -0.633  0.414  0.826               
Lack of property 
rights protection  (0.00) 
(0.00) 
(0.00)  (0.58)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)               
Freedom to compete  -0.100 
-0.122 
-0.735  -0.034  -0.684  0.356  0.293  0.487             
  (0.01) 
(0.00) 
(0.00)  (0.42)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)             
-0.259 
-0.196 
-0.739  -0.008  -0.799  0.370  0.376  0.585  0.746           
Government stance 
toward business  (0.00) 
(0.00) 
(0.00)  (0.85)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)           
-0.393 
0.027 
-0.393  0.033  -0.872  0.464  0.477  0.757  0.666  0.754         
Quality of 
bureaucracy  (0.00) 
(0.00) 
(0.00)  (0.44)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)         
Impact of crime  -0.032 
0.171 
0.080  -0.119  -0.539  0.211  0.059  0.182  0.569  0.430  0.470       
  (0.44) 
(0.00) 
(0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.15)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)       
Predation  -0.328 
-0.056 
-0.582  -0.019  -0.854  0.626  0.649  0.811  0.795  0.822  0.897  0.590     
  (0.00) 
(0.00) 
(0.00)  (0.66)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)     
Autocracy   -0.289 
0.038 
-0.148  -0.058  -0.076  0.372  0.259  0.433  0.242  0.226  0.267  -0.160  0.308   
  (0.00) 
(0.00) 
(0.00)  (0.17)  (0.06)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   
Anti-self dealing   0.311 
0.008 
0.315  0.004  0.504  -0.036  0.048  -0.320  -0.139  -0.421  -0.514  -0.358  -0.362  0.065 
  (0.00) 
(0.49) 
(0.00)  (0.92)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.24)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.11)   51 
Table IV 
WBES obstacles sample 
 
This table reports summary statistics (averages) for the WBES sample by country. Countries are sorted by GDP per capita in 2000. WBES variables are for 2000. Audit is the proportion of firms with 









































Ethiopia  105  $116  1.43%  1.00  36.06%  10.47  1.50  2.01  2.56  6.27  6.50%  10.14%  1.86 
Malawi  55  $169  26.50%  1.00  73.79%  10.50  3.15  2.11  2.62  7.89  20.08%  13.65%  2.18 
Tanzania  83  $190  13.49%  1.00  34.85%  9.55  2.13  2.32  2.93  7.42  19.06%  9.28%  1.83 
Madagascar  116  $246  9.62%  1.00  25.83%  7.77  2.27  2.54  3.39  8.18  9.95%  1.49%  2.08 
Nigeria  93  $254  12.76%  1.00  36.80%  9.34  3.30  2.34  3.40  8.92  14.17%  10.29%  2.15 
Cambodia  326  $297  7.71%  0.22  7.23%  10.68  3.11  2.19  -  -  17.54%  1.17%  1.31 
Kenya  113  $328  7.06%  1.00  17.86%  9.20  2.99  2.35  3.46  8.77  23.90%  10.95%  2.27 
Uganda  137  $348  4.99%  1.00  27.92%  9.88  2.81  2.21  3.13  8.22  15.31%  7.05%  1.56 
Haiti  103  $367  14.07%  0.33  -0.28%  9.76  3.75  2.82  3.17  9.72  12.12%  0.72%  1.68 
Bangladesh  50  $373  5.78%  0.95  19.89%  11.22  2.40  2.91  3.50  8.70  0.00%  0.00%  2.02 
Zambia  84  $392  30.41%  1.00  36.60%  9.89  2.87  2.29  2.76  7.88  15.81%  5.48%  1.90 
Ghana  119  $413  22.61%  1.00  27.55%  11.43  2.48  2.18  2.68  7.39  15.06%  6.48%  1.91 
India  210  $459  7.33%  0.97  14.77%  11.90  1.90  2.28  2.80  6.92  9.16%  3.43%  2.22 
Nicaragua  100  $466  10.68%  0.63  20.67%  10.26  2.43  2.99  2.87  8.29  7.79%  0.90%  1.62 
Uzbekistan  125  $485  -  0.48  63.80%  12.03  1.64  2.60  2.24  6.64  6.94%  16.75%  1.82 
Georgia  129  $499  15.96%  0.43  14.37%  11.07  2.63  3.33  3.03  9.05  7.05%  18.19%  1.53 
Azerbaijan  128  $506  3.46%  0.08  -20.03%  12.59  2.37  2.98  2.76  8.22  1.65%  18.05%  1.41 
Pakistan  103  $516  7.04%  0.52  5.13%  11.01  2.94  3.24  3.29  9.45  3.83%  1.80%  1.83 
Senegal  124  $609  1.57%  1.00  21.81%  10.92  2.13  2.07  2.94  7.20  5.07%  2.24%  1.69 
Zimbabwe  129  $621  28.24%  1.00  55.91%  10.50  2.69  2.54  2.86  8.03  17.74%  2.33%  1.90 
Moldova  125  $636  18.54%  0.43  -14.74%  10.19  3.12  3.48  2.88  9.49  0.74%  21.02%  1.78 
Cameroon  58  $675  3.37%  1.00  20.28%  10.00  2.37  2.33  3.39  8.20  42.24%  7.55%  1.93 
Honduras  100  $711  15.99%  0.65  9.74%  10.48  2.55  2.76  2.78  8.03  9.66%  0.00%  1.70 
Cote d'Ivoire  96  $743  2.95%  1.00  21.12%  10.55  2.33  2.27  3.29  8.07  29.16%  3.22%  2.05 
China  101  $824  1.81%  0.43  5.03%  12.35  1.72  2.08  2.03  5.87  21.56%  18.40%  1.81 
Kyrgyzstan  125  $885  22.66%  0.33  0.41%  9.48  3.13  3.54  3.34  10.09  2.25%  19.58%  1.75 
Ukraine  225  $896  28.05%  0.36  3.14%  9.23  2.39  3.66  2.40  8.48  1.20%  12.09%  1.63 
Albania  163  $899  15.47%  0.50  22.30%  10.34  3.23  3.05  3.25  9.53  8.42%  7.98%  1.40 
Bolivia  100  $952  6.53%  0.79  3.78%  10.25  2.23  3.10  3.55  8.87  15.60%  0.00%  1.95 
Armenia  125  $976  9.97%  0.18  -20.45%  10.81  1.52  3.45  1.90  6.78  1.36%  14.76%  1.40 
Indonesia  101  $994  16.40%  0.53  -5.43%  9.52  2.53  2.53  2.61  7.69  13.00%  4.51%  1.87 
Philippines  100  $1,167  6.89%  0.81  7.02%  12.01  2.58  3.08  3.11  8.75  14.37%  0.50%  1.95 
Egypt  102  $1,226  4.66%  1.00  17.23%  11.52  2.49  2.87  3.15  8.56  9.08%  3.68%  2.19 
West Bank-Gaza  100  $1,365  -  0.52  -11.21%  12.33  2.04  2.57  2.85  7.30  2.40%  1.08%  1.20 
Ecuador  100  $1,425  30.63%  0.62  -6.46%  10.40  2.99  3.08  3.54  9.58  7.63%  2.30%  1.99 
Romania  125  $1,460  55.75%  0.18  6.80%  9.70  2.22  3.55  2.83  8.58  9.10%  16.34%  1.47 
Bulgaria  125  $1,503  138.71%  0.31  15.16%  11.29  2.58  3.10  2.59  8.27  3.97%  20.84%  1.54 
Kazakhstan  127  $1,512  16.56%  0.37  9.72%  9.82  2.27  3.25  2.50  8.13  2.97%  19.80%  1.66 
Guatemala  106  $1,558  7.72%  0.63  18.44%  11.38  3.01  2.75  2.62  8.38  11.32%  0.00%  1.83 
El Salvador  104  $1,752  4.24%  0.93  -1.85%  11.31  3.64  2.99  3.03  9.68  10.27%  0.48%  1.92   52 
Lithuania  112  $2,056  9.38%  0.17  8.04%  9.34  2.57  3.31  2.57  8.60  2.75%  0.53%  1.20 
Dominican Republic  111  $2,062  6.06%  0.90  21.18%  10.56  2.95  2.99  2.94  8.86  14.77%  2.50%  2.16 
Colombia  101  $2,290  14.87%  0.88  6.02%  10.69  3.04  3.12  2.78  8.96  26.60%  1.83%  2.36 
Peru  108  $2,368  6.69%  0.79  -2.38%  11.07  2.32  3.26  2.83  8.40  14.98%  %0.05%  2.06 
Namibia  95  $2,408  7.60%  1.00  36.45%  13.21  2.70  1.80  1.63  6.17  19.45%  9.47%  1.81 
Russia  525  $2,455  33.16%  0.43  28.99%  9.27  2.56  3.53  2.55  8.68  0.77%  6.73%  1.70 
Tunisia  52  $2,470  3.24%  1.00  19.78%  14.64  1.29  1.73  2.13  5.15  10.69%  22.95%  2.42 
Belarus  125  $2,760  79.21%  0.46  10.44%  10.15  1.72  3.33  1.78  6.80  2.88%  22.42%  1.89 
Thailand  422  $2,805  4.18%  0.83  37.81%  11.11  3.73  3.22  3.47  9.00  18.07%  0.70%  1.60 
Turkey  150  $3,134  55.45%  0.43  10.23%  11.15  2.12  3.11  2.88  8.11  4.27%  16.37%  1.75 
Belize  50  $3,141  1.33%  0.64  12.35%  13.02  1.61  2.58  2.10  6.23  9.60%  3.38%  1.38 
Panama  100  $3,279  1.10%  0.92  8.86%  12.39  2.73  2.37  2.86  7.95  11.17%  1.50%  2.26 
Venezuela  100  $3,300  47.90%  0.93  -1.56%  9.62  2.69  3.10  3.03  8.81  16.77%  1.53%  2.02 
Mexico  100  $3,819  17.73%  0.78  24.34%  10.48  3.31  3.20  3.33  9.85  7.61%  0.00%  2.03 
Costa Rica  100  $3,912  12.32%  0.80  24.62%  12.46  2.28  2.79  2.51  7.58  20.81%  4.20%  2.16 
Botswana  101  $3,951  7.98%  1.00  40.43%  13.57  1.92  1.69  1.69  5.36  32.93%  17.82%  1.84 
South Africa  121  $3,985  6.46%  1.00  33.37%  12.56  3.53  2.33  2.60  8.48  27.97%  6.61%  2.43 
Slovakia  129  $4,160  7.04%  0.36  14.22%  11.06  2.28  3.12  2.38  7.82  1.32%  16.73%  1.53 
Poland  225  $4,223  12.06%  0.53  32.67%  11.14  1.94  3.04  2.21  7.07  4.67%  12.14%  1.65 
Estonia  132  $4,431  10.69%  0.34  63.36%  11.26  1.61  2.75  1.85  6.12  9.94%  6.30%  1.66 
Brazil  201  $4,624  7.28%  0.82  2.57%  10.02  2.42  3.61  2.49  8.52  19.63%  1.22%  2.00 
Malaysia  100  $4,797  3.09%  0.47  1.12%  12.54  1.58  1.86  1.85  5.31  4.51%  2.50%  1.70 
Trinidad &Tobago  101  $5,123  3.94%  0.68  18.11%  11.69  1.56  2.78  1.78  6.14  10.95%  2.98%  1.64 
Croatia  127  $5,146  4.69%  0.91  9.71%  11.46  2.10  3.33  2.62  8.13  5.08%  20.99%  1.98 
Bosnia  105  $5,277  -  0.51  66.10%  10.96  1.77  3.28  2.57  7.50  4.71%  18.74%  1.70 
Czech Republic  137  $5,311  6.58%  0.21  10.18%  10.49  1.79  3.20  2.14  7.09  12.02%  16.20%  1.43 
Chile  100  $5,354  5.03%  0.83  8.96%  13.20  1.84  2.22  1.87  5.96  23.91%  3.49%  2.01 
Hungary  129  $5,425  14.10%  0.59  27.88%  11.51  1.65  3.08  1.91  6.59  4.82%  15.67%  1.50 
Uruguay  100  $6,115  14.98%  0.62  0.08%  12.45  1.21  3.23  2.12  6.44  9.82%  0.00%  2.03 
Argentina  100  $7,933  -0.10%  0.78  7.82%  10.39  1.90  3.32  2.62  7.87  19.32%  0.43%  1.88 
Slovenia  125  $11,659  8.59%  0.66  29.11%  11.17  1.52  2.83  1.63  6.00  9.10%  20.75%  1.80 
Portugal  100  $12,794  2.62%  0.86  11.94%  12.27  1.52  1.98  1.72  5.18  13.16%  2.25%  1.86 
Spain  104  $17,798  2.59%  0.71  25.15%  11.16  1.63  2.64  2.15  6.31  13.85%  4.65%  1.81 
Italy  100  $20,885  2.40%  0.69  15.58%  9.88  1.97  3.25  1.76  7.05  18.23%  6.22%  2.02 
U.K.  102  $21,667  2.66%  0.66  28.13%  11.27  1.41  2.78  1.29  5.47  7.03%  2.57%  1.41 
Canada  101  $22,541  1.47%  0.68  17.20%  12.82  1.28  2.56  1.31  5.15  10.74%  0.43%  2.02 
Singapore  99  $28,230  0.90%  0.95  11.88%  14.90  1.30  1.49  1.25  4.05  24.31%  1.87%  1.94 
France  100  $29,811  1.22%  0.87  20.05%  11.84  1.40  3.19  1.60  6.24  13.13%  1.76%  1.88 
Sweden  102  $31,206  0.46%  0.96  23.19%  11.46  1.27  2.64  1.18  5.07  15.15%  6.09%  1.72 
U.S.  100  $31,996  2.45%  0.66  16.53%  11.94  1.51  2.38  1.84  5.73  5.68%  6.20%  1.82 




123.9  $5,051  13.19% 
 
 
0.69  17.43% 
 
 
11.05  2.29  2.78  2.55  7.60  11.87%  7.49%  1.82 
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  Table V 
Correlation coefficients, WBES sample 
 
This table reports the correlation coefficients between the main variables for the WBES sample. The WBES variables are for 2000. All of the other variables are for 2000. The numbers in 
parentheses are probability levels at which the hypothesis of zero correlation can be rejected. The coefficients significant at the 10% level (based on a two-tailed test) or higher are in bold- 
face. All of the variables are defined in Appendixes A, B, C, and D and Table I.  
 























GDP per capita  0.073                     
  (0.00)                     
Inflation  -0.173  -0.272                   
  (0.00)  (0.00)                   
Audit  0.150  0.078  -0.187                 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)                 
Laws and regulations  0.065  0.126  -0.136  0.140               
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)               
Corruption obstacle  -0.071  -0.338  0.083  -0.011  -0.251             
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.35)  (0.00)             
Tax obstacle  -0.175  -0.054  0.192  -0.153  -0.279  0.268           
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)           
Crime obstacle  -0.006  -0.281  0.095  -0.031  -0.177  0.567  0.171         
  (0.62)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)         
Composite obstacles  -0.115  -0.318  0.168  -0.091  -0.311  0.829  0.610  0.812       
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)       
Foreign ownership  0.101    0.027  -0.096  0.220  0.033  -0.020  -0.107    0.000  -0.062     
  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.98)  (0.00)     
State ownership  -0.034  -0.038  0.113  0.012  0.116  -0.082  -0.033  -0.069  -0.082  -0.092   
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.26)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   
Firm size  0.087  0.027  -0.043  0.348  0.144  -0.045  -0.078  -0.030  -0.063  0.189  0.188 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
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Figure 2 
Abnormal firm governance and predation  
 
These figures plot abnormal levels of firm governance against predation or composite obstacles. Panel A plots the CLSA sample, Panel B plots the S&P sample, Panel 
C plots the ISS sample, and Panel D plots the WBES sample. The abnormal levels of firm governance are defined as residuals of the following regressions: OLS 
regressions of CLSA governance, S&P disclosure, or ISS governance on growth opportunities, industry dependence on external financing, size, cash, cross-listing 
dummy, anti-self dealing, GDP per capita, financial development, black market, freedom of press, and industry dummies (for the CLSA, S&P, and ISS samples, 
respectively); probit regressions of audit on laws and regulations, firm size, foreign ownership, GDP per capita, and industry dummies (for the WBES sample). The 
intercepts and the slopes of the lines are determined by OLS regressions of country averages of abnormal firm governance on predation or composite obstacles. The 
CLSA sample is either for 2000 or 2001. The S&P transparency is either for 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, or 2001. ISS governance is for December 2005. WBES variables 
are for 2000. All of the variables are defined in Appendixes A, B, C, and D and Table I. 
Panel A: CLSA sample
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Panel C: ISS sample
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Table VI 
Predation and firm governance 
OLS and Probit regressions of firm governance on predation, autocracy, and obstacles with clustered (by country) standard 
errors 
 
The dependent variables are CLSA governance, S&P transparency, ISS governance (Panel A), or WBES audit (Panel B). The independent variables are predation, 
autocracy, corruption, risk of government expropriation, lack of property rights protection, government stance towards business, freedom to compete, quality of 
bureaucracy, impact of crime, growth opportunities, industry dependence on external financing, cash, size, cross-listing dummy, anti-self dealing, GDP per capita, 
financial development, black market, freedom of press, and industry dummies (Panel A: CLSA, S&P, and ISS samples); crime obstacles, tax and regulation obstacles, 
corruption obstacles, composite obstacles, laws and regulations, firm size, foreign ownership, GDP per capita, and industry dummies (Panel B: WBES sample). The 
reported regressions in Panel A are run using OLS. The reported regressions in Panel B are run using the probit method. The numbers in parentheses are probability 
levels at which the null hypothesis of zero coefficient can be rejected. The coefficients significant at the 10% level (based on a two-tailed test) or higher are in boldface. 
The CLSA sample is either for 2000 or 2001. The S&P transparency is either for 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, or 2001. ISS governance is for December 2005. WBES 
variables are for 2000. All of the variables are defined in Appendixes A, B, C, and D and Table I. 
 
Panel A 
 Dependent variable  CLSA governance  S&P transparency  ISS governance 
Predation  -1.076  -  -  -0.435  -  -  -0.279  -  - 
  (0.05)       (0.04)       (0.07)      
Autocracy  -  -0.816  -  -  -0.169  -  -  0.560  - 
     (0.01)        (0.10)        (0.30)    
Corruption  -  -  -4.208  -  -  -5.054  -  -  -2.797 
       (0.01)       (0.00)       (0.15) 
Risk of government expropriation  -  -  -3.397  -  -  -3.278  -  -  2.336 
       (0.38)       (0.52)       (0.19) 
Lack of property rights protection  -  -  3.449  -  -  1.771  -  -  -1.216 
       (0.26)       (0.59)       (0.69) 
Government stance towards business  -  -  -0.265  -  -  -3.137  -  -  -8.160 
       (0.90)       (0.05)       (0.00) 
Freedom to compete  -  -  0.906  -  -  -7.411  -  -  -1.769 
       (0.70)       (0.00)       (0.58) 
Quality of bureaucracy  -  -  -6.612  -  -  -5.437  -  -  3.048 
       (0.03)       (0.01)       (0.16) 
Impact of crime  -  -  -2.968  -  -  -8.643  -  -  1.109 
       (0.09)       (0.00)       (0.61) 
Growth opportunities  1.736  1.374  1.956  1.520  1.582  1.138  0.821  0.848  0.654 
  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.06)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Dependence on external financing  0.985  1.023  1.080  0.490  0.551  0.864  0.744  0.051  -0.052 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.00)  (0.19)  (0.93)  (0.88) 
Size  0.441  0.132  0.115  1.613  1.684  0.562  1.196  1.262  1.827 
  (0.40)  (0.77)  (0.79)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.12)  (0.00)  (0.04)  (0.00) 
Cash  -7.109  -8.436  -2.854  -37.802  -39.172  -10.667  0.979  0.537  -0.825 
  (0.22)  (0.12)  (0.55)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.36)  (0.56)  (0.41) 
Cross-listing dummy  3.387  3.807  3.288  4.780  5.250  5.570  6.014  6.134  6.308 
  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.22)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.17)  (0.08)  (0.15) 
Anti-self dealing  13.991  14.367  16.199  25.746  28.807  44.066  2.490  4.115  -5.113 
  (0.08)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.69)  (0.49)  (0.20) 
GDP per capita  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.32)  (0.28)  (0.31)  (0.11)  (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.88)  (0.93)  (0.98) 
Financial development  0.728  0.743  0.791  1.030  1.152  1.260  1.491  1.390  1.173 
  (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.10) 
Black market  0.769  0.768  0.733  0.257  0.215  0.297  0.555  0.542  0.511 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.05)  (0.46)  (0.52)  (0.40)  (0.18)  (0.33)  (0.38) 
Freedom of press  0.198  0.168  0.182  0.185  0.197  0.122  0.402  0.484  0.649 
  (0.18)  (0.21)  (0.18)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.22)  (0.22)  (0.18) 
Number of observations  531  531  531  1,414  1,414  1,414  6,378  6,378  6,378 
Regression R
2  0.197  0.223  0.334  0.529  0.524  0.799  0.114  0.126  0.285 
F-test of joint significance  36.570  29.150  92.060  9.630  11.180  69.680  4.860  88.410  37.420 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
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Panel B 
 Dependent variable  WBES Audit 
Composite obstacles  -0.030  - 
  (0.05)    
Corruption obstacle  -  -0.031 
     (0.00) 
Taxes and regulation obstacle  -  -0.056 
     (0.00) 
Crime obstacle  -  -0.004 
     (0.72) 
Laws and regulations  0.012  0.009 
  (0.01)  (0.04) 
Firm size  0.189  0.185 
  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Foreign ownership  0.208  0.195 
  (0.00)  (0.00) 
GDP per capita  0.000  0.000 
  (0.23)  (0.11) 
Number of observations  6,252  6,252 
Regression R
2  0.177  0.189 
F-test of joint significance  38.100  34.670 
  (0.00)  (0.00) 
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Table VII 
Firm performance, firm governance and predation 
OLS regressions of firm performance on firm governance, predation, autocracy, and obstacles with clustered (by 
country) standard errors 
 
The dependent variables are firm valuation (Panel A: CLSA, S&P, and ISS samples) and firm performance (Panel B: WBES sample). The independent 
variables are firm governance, predation, autocracy, corruption, risk of government expropriation, lack of property rights protection, government stance 
towards business, freedom to compete, quality of bureaucracy, impact of crime, growth opportunities, size, cross-listing dummy, anti-self dealing, GDP per 
capita, financial development, and industry dummies (CLSA, S&P, and ISS samples); audit, crime obstacles, taxes and regulation obstacles, corruption 
obstacles, composite obstacles, laws and regulations, firm size, foreign ownership, state ownership, GDP per capita, inflation, and industry dummies 
(WBES sample). The numbers in parentheses are probability levels at which the null hypothesis of zero coefficient can be rejected. The coefficients 
significant at the 10% level (based on a two-tailed test) or higher are in bold face. The CLSA sample is either for 2000 or 2001. The S&P transparency is 
either for 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, or 2001. ISS governance is for December 2005. WBES variables are for 2000. All of the variables are defined in 
Appendixes A, B, C, and D and Table I. 
 
Panel A 
 Dependent variable  Valuation 
CLSA governance  0.008  0.009  0.011  -  -  -  -  -  - 
  (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.01)             
S&P transparency  -  -  -  0.016  0.016  0.012  -  -  - 
          (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.19)        
ISS governance  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.009  0.009  0.009 
                 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Predation  -0.014  -  -  -0.014  -  -  -0.018  -  - 
  (0.03)       (0.10)       (0.07)      
Autocracy  -  -0.013  -  -  -0.017  -  -  -0.009  - 
     (0.10)       (0.02)       (0.10)    
Corruption  -  -  -0.137  -  -  -0.154  -  -  -0.038 
       (0.01)      (0.01)      (0.05) 
Risk of government expropriation  -  -  -0.187  -  -  -0.261  -  -  -0.074 
       (0.05)      (0.03)      (0.70) 
Lack of property rights protection  -  -  -0.191  -  -  -0.168  -  -  0.173 
       (0.00)      (0.07)      (0.18) 
Government stance towards business  -  -  0.052  -  -  0.105  -  -  0.067 
       (0.49)      (0.21)      (0.51) 
Freedom to compete  -  -  -0.123  -  -  -0.134  -  -  -0.077 
       (0.16)      (0.10)      (0.39) 
Quality of bureaucracy  -  -  0.354  -  -  0.126  -  -  -0.014 
       (0.00)      (0.02)      (0.08) 
Impact of crime  -  -  -0.069  -  -  -0.218  -  -  -0.021 
       (0.14)      (0.02)      (0.78) 
Growth opportunities  0.445  0.442  0.441  0.341  0.340  0.318  0.060  0.057  0.030 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.58)  (0.62)  (0.83) 
Size  -0.150  -0.152  -0.142  -0.215  -0.219  -0.217  -0.092  -0.094  -0.094 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Cross-listing dummy  -0.016  -0.023  -0.017  -0.085  -0.083  -0.067  0.083  0.093  0.077 
  (0.61)  (0.57)  (0.87)  (0.22)  (0.27)  (0.48)  (0.36)  (0.32)  (0.67) 
Anti-self dealing  -0.145  -0.064  0.103  -0.384  -0.294  0.670  -0.348  -0.270  -0.107 
  (0.48)  (0.73)  (0.58)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.08)  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.69) 
GDP per capita  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.56)  (0.36)  (0.25)  (0.07)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.11) 
Financial development  0.001  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.04)  (0.30)  (0.09)  (0.31)  (0.36)  (0.38)  (0.22)  (0.45)  (0.43) 
Number of observations  469  469  469  1,349  1,349  1,349  5,856  5,856  5,856 
Regression R
2  0.266  0.268  0.311  0.279  0.280  0.301  0.291  0.291  0.361 
F-test of joint significance  292.240  212.820  5142.210  44.680  36.850  48.620  96.170  106.480  112.390 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   59 
Panel B 
   Performance 
Audit  0.120  0.114 
  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Corruption obstacle  -  -0.011 
     (0.09) 
Taxes and regulation obstacle  -  -0.053 
     (0.00) 
Crime obstacle  -  0.011 
     (0.23) 
Composite obstacles  -0.012  - 
  (0.02)    
Laws and regulations  0.002  0.000 
  (0.51)  (0.92) 
Firm size  0.041  0.039 
  (0.00)  (0.01) 
Foreign ownership  0.000  0.000 
  (0.06)  (0.12) 
State ownership  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.18)  (0.19) 
GDP per capita  0.000  0.000 
  (0.08)  (0.05) 
Inflation  -0.261  -0.238 
  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Number of observations  4,351  4,351 
Regression R
2  0.074  0.082 
F-test of joint significance  17.210  16.460 
  (0.00)  (0.00)   60 
 
Table VIII 
The impact of predation on the relation between firm governance and firm performance 
OLS regressions of firm performance on firm governance, predation, autocracy, obstacles, and their interactions 
with firm governance with clustered (by country) standard errors 
 
The dependent variables are firm valuation (CLSA, S&P, and ISS samples) and firm performance (WBES sample). The independent variables are firm 
governance, predation, autocracy, their interactions with firm governance; growth opportunities, size, cross-listing dummy, anti-self dealing, GDP per capita, 
financial development, and industry dummies (CLSA, S&P, and ISS samples); audit, composite obstacles, its interaction with audit; laws and regulations, firm 
size, foreign ownership, state ownership, GDP per capita, inflation, and industry dummies (WBES sample). The numbers in parentheses are probability levels 
at which the null hypothesis of zero coefficient can be rejected. The coefficients significant at the 10% level (based on a two-tailed test) or higher are in bold 
face. The CLSA sample is either for 2000 or 2001. The S&P transparency is either for 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, or 2001. ISS governance is for December 
2005. WBES variables are for 2000. All of the variables are defined in Appendixes A, B, C, and D and Table I. 
 
Panel A 
 Dependent variable  Valuation 
CLSA governance  0.006  0.061  -  -  -  - 
  (0.46)  (0.04)            
S&P transparency  -  -  0.015  0.018  -  - 
        (0.12)  (0.00)      
ISS governance  -  -  -  -  0.027  0.007 
              (0.02)  (0.58) 
Predation  -0.068  -  -0.017  -  -0.066  - 
  (0.04)     (0.09)     (0.02)    
Autocracy  -  -0.052  -  -0.009  -  -0.080 
     (0.08)     (0.18)    (0.04) 
CLSA governance * Predation  -0.001  -  -  -  -  - 
  (0.09)               
CLSA governance * Autocracy  -  -0.001  -  -  -  - 
     (0.07)            
S&P transparency * Predation  -  -  -0.007  -  -  - 
        (0.09)         
S&P transparency * Autocracy  -  -  -  -0.008  -  - 
           (0.08)      
ISS governance * Predation  -  -  -  -  -0.003  - 
              (0.25)    
ISS governance * Autocracy  -  -  -  -  -  -0.003 
                (0.26) 
Growth opportunities  0.434  0.428  0.340  0.341  0.057  0.059 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.60)  (0.61) 
Size  -0.154  -0.152  -0.216  -0.219  -0.093  -0.094 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Cross-listing dummy  -0.018  -0.012  -0.043  0.153  0.120  0.132 
  (0.27)  (0.23)  (0.28)  (0.58)  (0.56)  (0.54) 
Anti-self dealing  -0.089  -0.102  -0.388  -0.295  -0.342  -0.263 
  (0.67)  (0.61)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.02)  (0.05) 
GDP per capita  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.97)  (0.90)  (0.08)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Financial development  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.000 
  (0.06)  (0.14)  (0.31)  (0.36)  (0.47)  (0.44) 
Number of observations  469  469  1,349  1,349  5,856  5,856 
Regression R
2  0.274  0.270  0.279  0.280  0.261  0.260 
F-test of joint significance  679.830  380.530  56.350  48.040  1538.520  1969.100 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   61 
Panel B 
   Performance 
Audit  0.066 
  (0.37) 
Composite obstacles  -0.016 
  (0.04) 
Audit * Composite obstacles  -0.007 
  (0.04) 
Laws and regulations  0.002 
  (0.46) 
Firm size  0.041 
  (0.00) 
Foreign ownership  0.000 
  (0.06) 
State ownership  -0.001 
  (0.18) 
GDP per capita  0.000 
  (0.06) 
Inflation  -0.259 
  (0.00) 
Number of observations  4,351 
Regression R
2  0.074 
F-test of joint significance  16.020 
  (0.00)   62 
Table IX 
The impact of predation on the relation between firm governance and firm performance 
OLS regressions of firm performance on firm governance run on high- and low-predation, autocracy, and obstacles subsamples with clustered (by country) 
standard errors 
 
The dependent variables are firm valuation (Panel A: CLSA and S&P samples) and firm performance (Panel B: WBES sample). The independent variables are firm governance, growth opportunities, size, cross-
listing dummy, anti-self dealing, GDP per capita, financial development, and industry dummies (CLSA and S&P samples); audit, laws and regulations, firm size, foreign ownership, state ownership, GDP per 
capita, inflation, and industry dummies (WBES sample). High- (low-) predation subsample contains firms from countries that are above (below) 75
th (25
th) percentile of the predation index. High- (low-) autocracy 
sample contains firms from countries that are above (below) 75
th (25
th) percentile of the autocracy index.  High- (low-) obstacles sample contains firms for which the composite obstacles variable is above (below) 
75
th (25
th) percentile. The numbers in parentheses are probability levels at which the null hypothesis of zero coefficient can be rejected. Coefficients significant at least at the 10% level (based on two-tailed test) 
are in boldface. The CLSA sample is either for 2000 or 2001. The S&P transparency is either for 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, or 2001. WBES variables are for 2000. We test whether the coefficients in high 
subsamples are statistically different from coefficients in low subsamples by running joint-sample (both high- and low-subsamples) regressions using all independent variables and their interactions with a low 
sub-sample dummy variable. The dummy variable takes value of one for observations that belong to the low subsample and zero, otherwise. The reported difference in coefficients significance test is an F-test of 
joint significance of the low-subsample dummy interaction variables. The coefficients significant at the 10% level (based on a two-tailed test) or higher are in bold face. All of the variables are defined in 
Appendixes A, B, C, and D and Table I. 
 
Panel A 


















   Predation > 21  Predation < 15  Autocracy > 9  Autocracy < 6  Predation > 14  Predation < 12  Autocracy > 7  Autocracy < 4 
CLSA governance  0.009  0.014  0.012  0.011  -  -  -  - 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.19)  (0.04)           
S&P transparency  -  -  -  -  0.001  0.011  0.003  0.013 
             (0.90)  (0.09)  (0.70)  (0.01) 
Growth opportunities  0.270  0.991  0.451  0.609  0.366  0.432  0.539  0.205 
  (0.27)  (0.00)  (0.15)  (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.44) 
Size  -0.065  -0.142  -0.094  -0.086  0.120  0.254  0.151  0.221 
  (0.03)  (0.00)  (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.00) 
Cross-listing dummy  -0.016  -0.014  -0.015  -0.016  0.123  0.186  0.173  0.160 
  (0.20)  (0.25)  (0.27)  (0.23)  (0.36)  (0.24)  (0.19)  (0.21) 
Anti-self dealing  0.155  -0.180  0.059  0.022  0.014  0.021  0.044  0.262 
  (0.52)  (0.80)  (0.83)  (0.93)  (0.94)  (0.94)  (0.92)  (0.14) 
GDP per capita  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.18)  (0.66)  (0.89)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Difference in coefficients significance test  3.170  10.270  36.040  12.120 
  (0.23)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Number of observations  117  117  117  117  337  337  337  337 
Regression R
2  0.223  0.369  0.250  0.277  0.171  0.280  0.193  0.233 
F-test of joint significance  92.810  5.790  11.620  24.820  53.410  656.750  33.600  37.100 
  (0.00)  (0.06)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   63 
 
   Performance 
   High composite obstacles 
Low composite 
obstacles 
   Composite obstacles > 8  Composite obstacles < 6  
Audit  0.041  0.113 
  (0.41)  (0.02) 
Laws and regulations  0.001  0.002 
  (0.94)  (0.70) 
Firm size  0.001  0.042 
  (0.97)  (0.04) 
Foreign ownership  0.001  0.000 
  (0.07)  (0.67) 
State ownership  0.000  -0.001 
  (0.53)  (0.11) 
GDP per capita  0.000  0.000 
  (0.99)  (0.63) 
Inflation  -0.483  -0.358 
  (0.01)  (0.00) 
Difference significance test  17.040 
  (0.00) 
Number of observations  1,116  1,116 
Regression R
2  0.076  0.075 
F-test of joint significance  17.010  21.540 
  (0.00)  (0.00)   64 
Table X 
The impact of predation on the relation between firm governance and firm performance 
Country-by-country OLS regressions of firm performance on firm governance 
 
This table reports coefficients on firm governance (Panel A: ISS sample); and audit (Panel B: WBES sample). For each country, the dependent variables are 
firm valuation (ISS sample) and firm performance (WBES sample). Countries are sorted by predation (Panel A: ISS sample) and composite obstacles (Panel B: 
ISS sample). The independent variables are firm governance, growth opportunities, size, cross-listing dummy, and industry dummies (ISS sample); audit, laws 
and regulations, firm size, foreign ownership, state ownership, and industry dummies (WBES sample). The numbers in parentheses are probability levels at 
which the null hypothesis of zero coefficient can be rejected. The coefficients significant at the 10% level (based on a two-tailed test) or higher are in bold face. 
The ISS governance is for December 2005. WBES variables are for 2000. All of the variables are defined in Appendixes A, B, C, D and Table I. 
 
Panel A 
Dependent variable   Valuation 
Country  Predation  ISS governance  P-value 
Sweden   9  0.025  (0.03) 
U.K.   9  0.021  (0.01) 
Australia   10  0.020  (0.35) 
Canada   10  0.012  (0.28) 
Finland   10  0.033  (0.05) 
New Zealand   10  0.048  (0.31) 
Singapore   10  0.026  (0.10) 
Switzerland   10  0.030  (0.05) 
Denmark   11  0.013  (0.10) 
Netherlands   11  0.015  (0.02) 
Norway   11  0.025  (0.12) 
Austria   12  0.094  (0.17) 
Hong Kong   12  0.010  (0.26) 
U.S.   12  0.019  (0.00) 
Germany   13  -0.002  (0.89) 
Japan   13  -0.002  (0.73) 
Belgium   14  0.002  (0.40) 
Portugal   14  0.013  (0.15) 
France   15  -0.013  (0.31) 
Ireland   15  0.004  (0.30) 
Spain   15  -0.002  (0.62) 
Greece   16  -0.008  (0.75) 































Dependent variable  Valuation 
Country  Composite obstacles  Audit  P-value 
Singapore   4.05  0.406  (0.00) 
Sweden   5.07  0.470  (0.00) 
Canada   5.15  -0.004  (0.68) 
Portugal   5.18  0.111  (0.10) 
Malaysia   5.31  0.383  (0.03) 
U.K.   5.47  0.300  (0.53) 
U.S.   5.73  0.424  (0.02) 
China   5.87  -0.008  (0.15) 
Chile   5.96  0.393  (0.07) 
Slovenia   6.00  0.119  (0.09) 
Estonia   6.12  0.217  (0.10) 
Trinidad &Tobago  6.14  -0.016  (0.85) 
Belize   6.23  -0.15  (0.36) 
France   6.24  0.219  (0.05) 
Spain   6.31  -0.020  (0.83) 
Uruguay   6.44  0.013  (0.95) 
Germany   6.51  0.380  (0.08) 
Hungary   6.59  0.061  (0.55) 
Uzbekistan   6.64  0.076  (0.44) 
Armenia   6.78  0.054  (0.72) 
Belarus   6.80  0.027  (0.83) 
India   6.92  -0.503  (0.03) 
Italy   7.05  0.213  (0.10) 
Poland   7.07  -0.033  (0.74) 
Czech Republic   7.09  -0.500  (0.04) 
West Bank-Gaza  7.30  0.170  (0.59) 
Bosnia   7.50  -0.140  (0.16) 
Costa Rica   7.58  0.220  (0.07) 
Indonesia   7.69  0.291  (0.07) 
Slovakia   7.82  0.053  (0.73) 
Argentina   7.87  0.064  (0.71) 
Panama   7.95  -0.236  (0.36) 
Honduras   8.03  0.111  (0.69) 
Turkey   8.11  0.069  (0.53) 
Croatia   8.13  0.000  (0.99) 
Kazakhstan   8.13  0.063  (0.67) 
Azerbaijan   8.22  0.182  (0.50) 
Bulgaria   8.27  0.057  (0.71) 
Nicaragua   8.29  -0.069  (0.65) 
Guatemala   8.38  -0.258  (0.06) 
Peru   8.40  0.206  (0.09) 
Ukraine   8.48  0.093  (0.33) 
Brazil   8.52  -0.107  (0.58) 
Romania   8.58  0.061  (0.74) 
Lithuania   8.60  0.115  (0.07) 
Russia   8.68  -0.09  (0.11) 
Philippines   8.75  -0.014  (0.93) 
Venezuela   8.81  0.083  (0.83) 
Dominican Republic   8.86  -0.106  (0.54) 
Bolivia   8.87  -0.008  (0.96) 
Colombia   8.96  0.270  (0.09) 
Georgia   9.05  0.022  (0.72) 
Pakistan   9.45  -0.189  (0.31) 
Moldova   9.49  -0.048  (0.97) 
Albania   9.53  -0.159  (0.24) 
Ecuador   9.58  -0.133  (0.03) 
El Salvador   9.68  -0.099  (0.27) 
Haiti   9.72  -0.186  (0.17) 
Mexico   9.85  0.232  (0.97) 
Kyrgyzstan   10.09  0.183  (0.07)   66 
Figure 3 
Relation between sensitivity of firm performance to firm governance and predation, autocracy, and obstacles 
 
These figures plot the coefficients (sensitivities) reported in Table XVI (coefficients on firm governance for the ISS sample (Panel A); and audit for the 
WBES sample (Panel B)) against predation and autocracy indexes (ISS sample) and composite obstacles (WBES sample). The intercepts and the slopes 
of the lines are determined by OLS regressions of sensitivities on predation or composite obstacles. The ISS governance is for December 2005. WBES 
variables are for 2000. All of the variables are defined in Appendixes A, B, C, and D and Table I. 
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Table XI 
The impact of predation on firm governance determinants 
OLS and Probit regressions of firm governance on predation, autocracy, obstacles, and their interactions with 
governance determinants with clustered (by country) standard errors 
 
The dependent variables are CLSA governance, S&P transparency, ISS governance (Panel A), or WBES audit (Panel B). The independent variables are 
predation, autocracy, their interactions with growth opportunities, industry dependence on external financing, and size; growth opportunities, industry 
dependence on external financing, size, cash, cross-listing dummy, anti-self dealing, GDP per capita, financial development, black market, freedom of 
press, and industry dummies (Panel A: CLSA, S&P, and ISS samples); composite obstacles, its interaction with laws and regulations, firm size, and 
foreign ownership; laws and regulations, firm size, and foreign ownership, GDP per capita, and industry dummies (Panel B: WBES sample). The 
reported regressions in Panel A are run using the OLS method. The reported regressions in Panel B are run using the probit method. The numbers in 
parentheses are probability levels at which the null hypothesis of zero coefficient can be rejected. The coefficients significant at the 10% level (based on 
a two-tailed test) or higher are in bold face. The CLSA sample is either for 2000 or 2001. The S&P transparency is either for 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, or 
2001. ISS governance is for December 2005. WBES variables are for 2000. All of the variables are defined in Appendixes A, B, C, and D and Table I. 
 
Panel A 
 Dependent variable  CLSA governance  S&P transparency  ISS governance 
Predation  -2.088  -  -0.358  -  3.467  - 
  (0.02)     (0.07)     (0.07)    
Autocracy  -  -1.522  -  -0.232  -  -0.923 
  -  (0.08)     (0.88)    (0.13) 
Growth opportunities  -0.011  -0.093  2.203  1.150  0.816  -0.155 
  (0.77)  (0.23)  (0.16)  (0.33)  (0.57)  (0.83) 
Growth opportunities * Predation  -0.009  -  -0.049  -  0.002  - 
  (0.33)     (0.03)     (0.99)    
Growth opportunities * Autocracy  -  -0.305  -  0.077  -  -0.018 
     (0.00)     (0.68)    (0.02) 
Dependence on external financing  2.915  0.505  4.377  0.087  3.341  2.588 
  (0.43)  (0.72)  (0.17)  (0.92)  (0.05)  (0.06) 
Dependence on external financing * Predation  -0.016  -  -0.019  -  -0.361  - 
  (0.04)     (0.02)     (0.04)    
Dependence on external financing * Autocracy  -  -0.009  -  -0.011  -  -0.061 
     (0.06)     (0.46)    (0.05) 
Size  1.945  0.250  2.880  1.622  6.679  0.223 
  (0.07)  (0.28)  (0.04)  (0.18)  (0.03)  (0.57) 
Size * Predation  -0.129  -  -0.009  -  -0.456  - 
  (0.03)     (0.03)     (0.05)    
Size * Autocracy  -  -0.014  -  0.012  -  -0.018 
     (0.02)     (0.95)    (0.02) 
Cash  -6.935  -7.676  -38.075  -39.147  0.651  0.497 
  (0.23)  (0.12)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.48)  (0.53) 
Cross-listing dummy  4.091  4.739  5.259  5.954  4.814  6.681 
  (0.16)  (0.13)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.37)  (0.28) 
Anti-self dealing  13.994  14.037  25.419  28.839  3.975  3.022 
  (0.07)  (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.53)  (0.58) 
GDP per capita  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.000 
  (0.35)  (0.25)  (0.11)  (0.02)  (0.96)  (0.86) 
Financial development  0.863  0.913  1.120  1.476  1.954  1.753 
  (0.03)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02) 
Black market  0.819  1.179  0.461  0.593  0.667  0.426 
  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.47)  (0.42)  (0.18)  (0.33) 
Freedom of press  0.369  0.654  0.319  0.642  0.542  0.511 
  (0.18)  (0.11)  (0.04)  (0.01)  (0.12)  (0.23) 
Number of observations  531  531  1,414  1,414  6,378  6,378 
Regression R
2  0.203  0.232  0.533  0.525  0.130  0.130 
F-test of joint significance  830.600  89.730  16.830  12.220  67.410  100.720 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   68 
Panel B 
Dependent variable   WBES Audit 
Composite obstacles  0.020 
  (0.09) 
Laws and regulations  0.027 
  (0.01) 
Laws and regulations * Composite obstacles  -0.002 
  (0.10) 
Firm size  0.121 
  (0.00) 
Firm size * Composite obstacles  -0.009 
  (0.03) 
Foreign ownership  0.168 
  (0.00) 
Foreign ownership * Composite obstacles  -0.005 
  (0.30) 
GDP per capita  0.000 
  (0.24) 
Number of observations  6,252 
Regression R
2  0.179 
F-test of joint significance  34.260 
  (0.00)   69 
Table XII 
The impact of predation on firm governance determinants 
OLS and Probit regressions of firm governance on predation, autocracy, and obstacles run on high- and low-predation, autocracy, and obstacles 
subsamples with clustered (by country) standard errors 
 
The dependent variables are CLSA governance, S&P transparency (Panel A), or WBES audit (Panel B). The independent variables are growth opportunities, industry dependence on external financing, size, 
cash, cross-listing dummy, anti-self dealing, GDP per capita, financial development, black market, freedom of press, and industry dummies (CLSA and S&P samples); laws and regulations, firm size, foreign 
ownership, GDP per capita, and industry dummies (WBES sample). High- (low-) predation subsample contains firms from countries that are above (below) 75
th (25
th) percentile of the predation index. High- (low-) 
autocracy sample contains firms from countries that are above (below) 75
th (25
th) percentile of the autocracy index. High- (low-) obstacles sample contains firms for which the composite obstacles variable is 
above (below) 75
th (25
th) percentile. The reported regressions in Panel A are run using the OLS method. The reported regressions in Panel A are run using the probit method. The numbers in parentheses are 
probability levels at which the null hypothesis of zero coefficient can be rejected. The coefficients significant at the 10% level (based on a two-tailed test) or higher are in bold face. The CLSA sample is either for 
2000 or 2001. The S&P transparency is either for 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, or 2001. WBES variables are for 2000. All other variables are for 2000. We test whether the coefficients in high subsamples are 
statistically different from coefficients in low subsamples by running joint-sample (both high- and low-subsamples) regressions using all independent variables and their interactions with a low sub-sample dummy 
variable. The dummy variable takes value of one for observations that belong to the low subsample and zero, otherwise. The reported difference in coefficients significance test is an F-test of joint significance of 
the low-subsample dummy interaction variables.  All of the variables are defined in Appendixes A, B, C, and D and Table I. 
 
Panel A 


















   Predation > 21  Predation < 15  Autocracy > 9  Autocracy < 6  Predation > 14  Predation < 12  Autocracy > 7  Autocracy < 4 
Growth opportunities  1.558  3.881  2.029  2.622  0.392  1.872  0.136  0.900 
  (0.13)  (0.03)  (0.15)  (0.08)  (0.46)  (0.02)  (0.83)  (0.05) 
Dependence on external financing  -0.158  -0.831  1.096  2.416  -1.347  1.775  1.380  2.777 
  (0.72)  (0.58)  (0.12)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.07)  (0.01) 
Size  0.067  -0.087  0.126  0.672  1.223  1.944  1.459  2.702 
  (0.93)  (0.88)  (0.83)  (0.56)  (0.19)  (0.03)  (0.23)  (0.00) 
Cash  -2.920  -6.897  -11.019  -6.934  8.484  -34.881  5.891  -19.968 
  (0.62)  (0.05)  (0.20)  (0.02)  (0.30)  (0.01)  (0.48)  (0.01) 
Cross-listing dummy  0.359  0.334  1.679  1.556  1.293  1.690  1.915  1.984 
  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.15)  (0.24)  (0.25)  (0.10)  (0.29)  (0.25) 
Anti-self dealing  8.138  31.022  5.875  3.730  21.225  19.940  22.796  23.211 
  (0.40)  (0.01)  (0.24)  (0.66)  (0.00)  (0.10)  (0.00)  (0.01) 
GDP per capita  0.005  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.000 
  (0.00)  (0.06)  (0.30)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.07)  (0.03)  (0.18) 
Difference  in coefficients 
significance test  22.170  38.650  104.130  16.160 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Number of observations  132  132  132  132  353  353  353  353 
Regression R
2  0.425  0.232  0.156  0.113  0.505  0.307  0.526  0.430 
F-test of joint significance  0.950  12.070  2.250  17.330  89.680  317.140  18.340  193.850 
  (0.51)  (0.02)  (0.50)  (0.12)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   70 
Panel B 
 Dependent variable  WBES Audit 
   High composite obstacles 
Low composite 
obstacles 
   Composite obstacles > 8  Composite obstacles < 6  
Laws and regulations  0.008  0.023 
  (0.19)  (0.00) 
Firm size  0.236  0.158 
  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Foreign ownership  0.105  0.230 
  (0.33)  (0.00) 
GDP per capita  0.000  0.000 
  (0.15)  (0.05) 
Difference  in coefficients significance test  8.130 
  (0.00) 
Number of observations  1,594  1,594 
Regression R
2  0.190  0.204 
F-test of joint significance  33.820  18.200 
  (0.00)  (0.00)   71 
Table XIII 
The impact of predation on firm governance determinants 
OLS and Probit country-by-country regressions of firm governance on governance determinants 
 
This table reports coefficients on growth opportunities, industry dependence on external financing, and size (Panel A: ISS sample); laws and 
regulations, firm size, and foreign ownership (Panel B: WBES sample). Countries are sorted by predation (Panel A: ISS sample) and composite 
obstacles (Panel B: ISS sample). For each country, the dependent variables are ISS governance or WBES audit. The independent variables are 
growth opportunities, industry dependence on external financing, size, cash, cross-listing dummy, and industry dummies (ISS sample); laws and 
regulations, firm size, foreign ownership, and industry dummies (WBES sample). The reported regressions in Panel A are run using the OLS 
method. The reported regressions in Panel A are run using the probit method. The numbers in parentheses are probability levels at which the 
null hypothesis of zero coefficient can be rejected. The coefficients significant at the 10% level (based on a two-tailed test) or higher are in bold 




 Dependent variable  ISS governance 
Country  Predation  Growth opportunities  P-value 
Dependence on 
external 
financing  P-value  Size  P-value 
Sweden   9  1.744  (0.03)  -2.093  (0.85)  -0.380  (0.70) 
U.K.   9  0.812  (0.00)  -0.947  (0.48)  0.860  (0.00) 
Australia   10  0.810  (0.10)  -2.204  (0.45)  0.376  (0.27) 
Canada   10  0.881  (0.56)  7.033  (0.06)  0.351  (0.38) 
Finland   10  1.211  (0.54)  4.693  (0.56)  1.093  (0.10) 
New Zealand   10  1.675  (0.09)  5.568  (0.54)  0.735  (0.71) 
Singapore   10  1.983  (0.08)  -3.696  (0.34)  0.375  (0.44) 
Switzerland   10  0.874  (0.64)  2.064  (0.78)  0.762  (0.07) 
Denmark   11  5.977  (0.10)  7.895  (0.56)  0.577  (0.79) 
Netherlands   11  3.467  (0.04)  6.405  (0.32)  -0.013  (0.99) 
Norway   11  3.638  (0.05)  8.630  (0.46)  1.136  (0.04) 
Austria   12  1.539  (0.74)  -5.178  (0.44)  0.607  (0.06) 
Hong Kong   12  0.374  (0.61)  5.430  (0.17)  -0.355  (0.44) 
U.S.   12  1.009  (0.00)  -0.394  (0.25)  2.060  (0.00) 
Germany   13  0.240  (0.77)  4.370  (0.37)  -0.011  (0.98) 
Japan   13  -0.360  (0.21)  -1.344  (0.14)  -0.596  (0.00) 
Belgium   14  1.127  (0.49)  11.648  (0.17)  1.039  (0.02) 
Portugal   14  2.166  (0.73)  8.697  (0.75)  -0.577  (0.75) 
France   15  -2.098  (0.09)  -3.648  (0.40)  1.180  (0.02) 
Ireland   15  -0.287  (0.77)  -6.897  (0.59)  1.318  (0.38) 
Spain   15  0.180  (0.85)  3.009  (0.53)  -0.012  (0.99) 
Greece   16  0.121  (0.93)  -5.823  (0.33)  1.021  (0.22) 
Italy   19  0.428  (0.54)  5.975  (0.19)  -0.765  (0.15)   72 
Panel B 
Dependent variable  WBES audit 
Country  Composite obstacles 
Laws and 
regulations  P-value  Firm size  P-value  Foreign ownership  P-value 
Singapore   4.05  0.005  (0.82)  0.195  (0.02)  0.029  (0.55) 
Sweden   5.07  0.034  (0.03)  0.181  (0.03)  0.006  (0.92) 
Canada   5.15  0.010  (0.24)  0.212  (0.07)  0.243  (0.03) 
Portugal   5.18  0.030  (0.10)  0.134  (0.01)  0.047  (0.59) 
Malaysia   5.31  0.070  (0.03)  0.076  (0.12)  0.188  (0.29) 
U.K.   5.47  0.011  (0.61)  0.315  (0.00)  0.026  (0.87) 
U.S.   5.73  -0.049  (0.03)  0.248  (0.00)  0.079  (0.64) 
China   5.87  0.042  (0.02)  0.220  (0.00)  0.502  (0.00) 
Chile   5.96  0.006  (0.76)  0.105  (0.05)  0.150  (0.11) 
Slovenia   6.00  -0.003  (0.87)  0.393  (0.00)  0.101  (0.36) 
Estonia   6.12  0.005  (0.80)  0.161  (0.01)  0.482  (0.00) 
Trinidad &Tobago  6.14  0.060  (0.03)  0.142  (0.05)  0.177  (0.17) 
Belize   6.23  0.053  (0.10)  0.231  (0.01)  0.077  (0.70) 
France   6.24  0.035  (0.05)  0.159  (0.00)  0.231  (0.03) 
Spain   6.31  -0.004  (0.79)  0.333  (0.00)  0.116  (0.23) 
Uruguay   6.44  0.041  (0.10)  0.059  (0.58)  0.279  (0.06) 
Germany   6.51  0.030  (0.22)  0.186  (0.08)  0.118  (0.45) 
Hungary   6.59  0.013  (0.41)  0.290  (0.00)  0.113  (0.51) 
Uzbekistan   6.64  0.028  (0.10)  0.137  (0.09)  0.067  (0.65) 
Armenia   6.78  0.027  (0.04)  0.110  (0.18)  0.190  (0.21) 
Belarus   6.80  -0.001  (0.98)  0.147  (0.11)  0.007  (0.98) 
India   6.92  0.006  (0.26)  0.053  (0.01)  0.330  (0.02) 
Italy   7.05  -0.009  (0.63)  0.144  (0.08)  0.257  (0.03) 
Poland   7.07  0.002  (0.85)  0.261  (0.00)  0.261  (0.02) 
Czech Republic   7.09  -0.044  (0.00)  0.244  (0.00)  0.457  (0.00) 
West Bank-Gaza  7.30  -0.039  (0.38)  0.051  (0.86)  -0.059  (0.87) 
Bosnia   7.50  0.060  (0.01)  -0.034  (0.71)  0.233  (0.14) 
Costa Rica   7.58  0.017  (0.46)  -0.039  (0.64)  0.202  (0.13) 
Indonesia   7.69  -0.007  (0.68)  0.310  (0.00)  0.276  (0.02) 
Slovakia   7.82  0.022  (0.10)  0.389  (0.00)  0.261  (0.13) 
Argentina   7.87  0.026  (0.10)  0.066  (0.27)  0.232  (0.01) 
Panama   7.95  0.016  (0.20)  0.078  (0.08)  0.086  (0.27) 
Honduras   8.03  -0.014  (0.46)  0.209  (0.02)  0.134  (0.36) 
Turkey   8.11  0.007  (0.65)  0.155  (0.03)  0.484  (0.00) 
Croatia   8.13  0.028  (0.01)  0.098  (0.02)  0.350  (0.04) 
Kazakhstan   8.13  0.014  (0.43)  0.160  (0.09)  0.221  (0.12) 
Azerbaijan   8.22  0.010  (0.19)  0.169  (0.00)  0.395  (0.03) 
Bulgaria   8.27  0.004  (0.78)  0.293  (0.00)  0.342  (0.01) 
Nicaragua   8.29  -0.026  (0.18)  0.094  (0.18)  0.270  (0.07) 
Guatemala   8.38  0.013  (0.64)  0.177  (0.06)  0.218  (0.19) 
Peru   8.40  -0.007  (0.67)  0.136  (0.03)  0.048  (0.66) 
Ukraine   8.48  0.027  (0.02)  0.098  (0.09)  -0.018  (0.91) 
Brazil   8.52  -0.001  (0.91)  0.091  (0.26)  0.257  (0.00) 
Romania   8.58  0.037  (0.00)  0.060  (0.28)  0.408  (0.00) 
Lithuania   8.60  0.032  (0.01)  0.289  (0.00)  0.256  (0.08) 
Russia   8.68  0.017  (0.04)  0.185  (0.00)  -0.132  (0.40) 
Bangladesh   8.70  -0.005  (0.70)  0.014  (0.82)  0.020  (0.81) 
Philippines   8.75  0.047  (0.00)  0.098  (0.09)  0.112  (0.25) 
Venezuela   8.81  -0.009  (0.33)  -0.053  (0.12)  0.122  (0.07) 
Dominican Republic   8.86  -0.019  (0.20)  0.127  (0.01)  -0.032  (0.70) 
Bolivia   8.87  0.002  (0.92)  0.166  (0.02)  0.107  (0.34) 
Colombia   8.96  -0.001  (0.91)  0.018  (0.73)  -0.016  (0.82) 
Thailand   9.00  0.010  (0.43)  0.071  (0.13)  0.035  (0.64) 
Georgia   9.05  0.010  (0.55)  0.022  (0.81)  0.281  (0.04) 
Pakistan   9.45  0.068  (0.00)  0.087  (0.24)  -0.175  (0.52) 
Moldova   9.49  -0.033  (0.12)  0.028  (0.32)  -0.197  (0.34) 
Albania   9.53  -0.041  (0.01)  0.054  (0.12)  -0.005  (0.84) 
Ecuador   9.58  -0.002  (0.94)  0.067  (0.33)  -0.064  (0.73) 
El Salvador   9.68  0.005  (0.74)  0.164  (0.27)  -0.007  (0.94) 
Haiti   9.72  -0.005  (0.78)  0.028  (0.61)  -0.087  (0.23) 
Mexico   9.85  -0.003  (0.84)  -0.017  (0.78)  -0.114  (0.62) 
Kyrgyzstan   10.09  -0.004  (0.71)  0.093  (0.25)  -0.035  (0.85)   73 
Figure 4 
The impact of predation on firm governance determinants 
 
These figures plot the coefficients (sensitivities) reported in Table XI (coefficients on growth opportunities, industry dependence on external financing, and 
size for the ISS sample (Panel A); and laws and regulation, firm size, and foreign ownership for the WBES sample (Panel B) against predation (ISS 
sample) and composite obstacles (WBES sample). The intercepts and the slopes of the lines are determined by OLS regressions of sensitivities on 
predation or composite obstacles. The ISS governance is for December 2005. WBES variables are for 2000. All of the variables are defined in Appendixes 
A, B, C, and D and Table I. 
 
Panel A.1: ISS sample



























































Panel A.2: ISS sample





















































Panel B.1: WBES sample





































Panel B.2: WBES sample












































Panel B.3: WBES sample
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Table XIV 
Within-country variation in firm governance and predation 
OLS regressions of absolute values of abnormal firm governance on predation, autocracy, and obstacles with 
clustered (by country) standard errors 
 
This  table  reports  the  results  of  OLS  regressions  of  absolute  values  of  abnormal  levels  of  firm  governance  on  predation,  autocracy,  growth 
opportunities, industry dependence on external financing, cash, size, cross-listing dummy, anti-self dealing, GDP per capita, financial development, 
black market, freedom of press, and industry dummies (Panel A: CLSA, S&P, and ISS samples); composite obstacles, laws and regulations, firm size, 
foreign ownership, GDP per capita, and industry dummies (Panel B: WBES sample). The abnormal levels of governance are defined as residuals of 
the following regressions: OLS regression of governance and disclosure on growth opportunities, industry dependence on external financing, size, 
cash, cross-listing dummy, anti-self dealing, GDP per capita, financial development, black market, freedom of press and industry dummies (for the 
CLSA, S&P and ISS samples); audit on laws and regulations, firm size, foreign ownership, GDP per capita, and industry dummies (for the WBES 
sample). The numbers in parentheses are probability levels at which the null hypothesis of zero coefficient can be rejected. The coefficients significant 
at the 10% level (based on a two-tailed test) or higher are in bold face. The CLSA sample is either for 2000 or 2001. The S&P transparency is either 
for 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, or 2001. The ISS governance is for December 2005. WBES variables are for 2000. All of the variables are defined in 
Appendixes A, B, C, and D and Table I. 
  
Panel A 
 Dependent variable  |ε ε ε εCLSA|  |ε ε ε εSP|  |ε ε ε εISS| 
Predation  -0.370  -  -0.272  -  -0.198  - 
  (0.01)     (0.00)     (0.00)    
Autocracy  -  -0.138  -  -0.328  -  -0.384 
     (0.08)     (0.00)    (0.00) 
Growth opportunities  0.273  0.292  -0.362  -0.405  -0.045  -0.074 
  (0.35)  (0.32)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.53)  (0.29) 
Dependence on external financing  -1.028  -0.714  -0.586  -0.517  -0.029  0.024 
  (0.23)  (0.41)  (0.32)  (0.37)  (0.88)  (0.90) 
Size  0.665  0.613  -0.685  -0.650  0.081  0.110 
  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00) 
Cash  -1.707  -0.573  3.890  5.058  -0.044  -0.107 
  (0.62)  (0.87)  (0.07)  (0.02)  (0.91)  (0.77) 
Cross-listing dummy  0.217  0.218  0.623  0.602  0.713  0.777 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.31)  (0.38)  (0.40)  (0.34) 
Anti-self dealing  -2.673  -0.967  -2.281  0.378  0.258  -0.467 
  (0.07)  (0.52)  (0.01)  (0.62)  (0.66)  (0.36) 
GDP per capita  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.22)  (0.46)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.48)  (0.00) 
Financial development  1.934  1.567  2.410  2.329  1.661  1.689 
  (0.32)  (0.34)  (0.18)  (0.35)  (0.12)  (0.10) 
Black market  2.069  2.571  2.660  2.428  2.755  2.247 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.18)  (0.25)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Freedom of press  2.869  1.744  1.396  2.535  1.761  1.359 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Number of observations  531  531  1,414  1,414  6,378  6,378 
Regression R
2  0.095  0.054  0.106  0.138  0.021  0.038 
F-test of joint significance  3.610  1.950  10.990  14.960  1.760  3.260 
  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   76 
 
Panel B 
Dependent variable   |ε ε ε εAUDIT| 
Composite obstacles  -0.088 
  (0.00) 
Laws and regulations  -0.018 
  (0.00) 
Firm size  -0.004 
  (0.00) 
Foreign ownership  -0.161 
  (0.00) 
GDP per capita  0.000 
  (0.01) 
Number of observations  6,252 
Regression R
2  0.303 
F-test of joint significance  1.990 
  (0.00)   77 
Table XV 
Addressing endogeneity  
Instrumental variables regressions of firm governance determinants and firm valuation 
 
Panel A.1 reports the results of the governance determinants regressions for the CLSA, S&P, and ISS samples using distance from the equator, English language dummy, Western European language 
dummy, and trade share as instruments for predation. Panel B.1 reports the results of the governance determinants regression for the WBES sample using distance from the equator, Western European 
language dummy, and trade share as instruments for predation. Panel A.2 reports the results of firm valuation regressions for the CLSA, S&P, and ISS samples using distance from the equator, Western 
European language dummy, and trade share as instruments for predation and interaction of predation with firm governance. Panel A.2 reports the results of the firm performance regression for the WBES 
sample using distance from the equator, Western European language dummy, and trade share as instruments for composite obstacles and interaction of composite obstacles with audit. The numbers in 
parentheses are probability levels at which the null hypothesis of zero coefficient can be rejected. The coefficients significant at the 10% level (based on a two-tailed test) or higher are in bold face. The last 
row of the table contains the F-test statistics of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity. To perform the test, first, endogenous variables are regressed on the set of exogenous variables. Then the 
fitted values of residuals are used as additional variables of the base regressions. High values of the F-test of joint significant indicate endogeneity of the variables. The CLSA sample is either for 2000 or 
2001. The S&P transparency is either for 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, or 2001. The ISS governance is for December 2005. WBES variables are for 2000. All of the variables are defined in Appendixes A, B, C, 
and D and Table I. 
 
Panel A.1    Panel A.2 
 Dependent variable  CLSA governance  S&P transparency  ISS governance     Dependent variable  Valuation 
Instrumented Predation  -2.490  -1.672  -5.021    CLSA governance  0.800  -  - 
  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04)      (0.06)       
Growth opportunities  1.482  1.352  0.665    S&P transparency  -  0.046  - 
  (0.07)  (0.00)  (0.01)         (0.06)    
Dependence on external financing  0.725  -0.318  0.708    ISS governance  -  -  0.477 
  (0.23)  (0.42)  (0.05)            (0.03) 
Size  0.686  1.429  1.300    Instrumented Predation  -0.210  0.088  -1.981 
  (0.17)  (0.01)  (0.02)      (0.04)  (0.32)  (0.03) 
Cash  -0.079  -33.968  3.366    Instrumented CLSA governance * Predation  -0.005  -  - 
  (0.88)  (0.00)  (0.36)      (0.10)       
Cross-listing dummy  4.459  3.239  2.018    Instrumented S&P transparency * Predation  -  -0.002  - 
  (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.17)         (0.22)    
Anti-self dealing  14.459  17.027  -21.076    Instrumented ISS governance * Predation  -  -  -0.041 
  (0.10)  (0.04)  (0.58)            (0.02) 
GDP per capita  -0.001  0.000  0.000    Growth opportunities  0.525  0.413  0.299 
  (0.48)  (0.51)  (0.91)      (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.77) 
Financial development  1.433  1.347  2.028    Size  -0.177  -0.208  -0.092 
  (0.10)  (0.12)  (0.10)      (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Black market  -0.830  -0.234  -0.239    Cross-listing dummy  0.123  0.238  0.160 
  (0.00)  (0.33)  (0.22)      (0.10)  (0.20)  (0.66) 
Freedom of press  0.493  0.383  2.423    Anti-self dealing  -0.001  -0.155  0.980 
  (0.10)  (0.00)  (0.10)      (0.98)  (0.55)  (0.85) 
Number of observations  526  1,414  6,299    GDP per capita  0.000  0.000  0.000 
F-test of joint significance  237.930  6.950  65.890      (0.55)  (0.16)  (0.22) 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)    Financial development  0.012  0.081  0.003 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test   28.390  43.230  19.020      (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.40) 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)    Number of observations  514  1,385  5,856 
          F-test of joint significance  69.120  52.150  15.320 
            (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
          Durbin-Wu-Hausman test   17.110  22.380  30.290 
            (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
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Panel B.1    Panel B.2 
   WBES Audit       Performance 
Composite obstacles  -0.569    Audit  15.862 
  (0.06)      (0.01) 
Laws and regulations  0.478    Instrumented Composite obstacles  -1.657 
  (0.04)      (0.02) 
Firm size  0.021    Instrumented Audit * Composite obstacles  -2.032 
  (0.79)      (0.14) 
Foreign ownership  0.355    Laws and regulations  -0.005 
  (0.00)      (0.66) 
GDP per capita  0.000    Firm size  0.083 
  (0.08)      (0.03) 
Number of observations  5,541    Foreign ownership  0.000 
F-test of joint significance  17.500      (0.89) 
  (0.00)    State ownership  -0.002 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test   19.100      (0.28) 
  (0.00)    GDP per capita  0.000 
        (0.68) 
      Inflation  -0.430 
        (0.01) 
      Number of observations  3,959 
      F-test of joint significance  285.670 
        (0.00) 
      Durbin-Wu-Hausman test   13.090 
        (0.00)   79 
Table XVI 
Addressing endogeneity  
Panel regressions of time-differences in firm governance determinants and firm valuation with lagged levels as 
instruments for contemporaneous differences 
 
This table reports the result of instrumental variables regressions using lagged levels of variables as instruments for contemporaneous differences. Panel 
A.1 contains estimations of governance determinants regressions for the CLSA, S&P, and ISS samples. ∆CLSA governance is the difference in CLSA 
governance  between  2001  and  2000.  ∆S&P  transparency  is  the  difference  in  S&P  transparency  between  2001  and  2000.  ∆ISS  governance  is  the 
difference in ISS governance between 2005 and 2004. ∆Growth opportunities is the difference in Growth opportunities between 2001 and 2000 for the 
CLSA and S&P samples, and 2005 and 2004 for the ISS sample. ∆Size is the difference in Size between 2001 and 2000 for the CLSA and S&P samples, 
and 2005 and 2004 for the ISS sample. ∆Cash is the difference in Cash between 2001 and 2000 for the CLSA and S&P samples, and 2005 and 2004 for 
the ISS sample. ∆GDP per capita is the difference in GDP per capita between 2001 and 2000 for the CLSA and S&P samples, and 2005 and 2004 for the 
ISS sample. ∆Financial development is the difference in Financial development between 2001 and 2000 for the CLSA and S&P samples, and 2005 and 
2004 for the ISS sample. The instruments are Growth opportunities in 1999 for the CLSA and S&P samples and in 2003 for the ISS sample; Size in 1999 
for the CLSA and S&P samples and in 2003 for the ISS sample; Cash in 1999 for the CLSA and S&P samples and in 2003 for the ISS sample; Growth 
opportunities * Predation in 1999 for the CLSA and S&P samples and in 2003 for the ISS sample; Size * Predation in 1999 for the CLSA and S&P samples 
and in 2003 for the ISS sample; GDP per capita in 1999 for the CLSA and S&P samples and in 2003 for the ISS sample; Financial development in 1999 for 
the CLSA and S&P samples and in 2003 for the ISS sample. The instrumented variables are ∆Growth opportunities, ∆Size, ∆Cash, ∆Growth opportunities 
* Predation, ∆Size * Predation, ∆GDP per capita, and ∆Financial development. Panel A.2 contains estimations of firm valuation regressions for the CLSA, 
S&P, and ISS samples. ∆Valuation is the difference in Valuation between 2001 and 2000 for the CLSA and S&P samples, and 2005 and 2004 for the ISS 
sample. The instruments are CLSA governance in 2000, S&P transparency in 2000, ISS governance in 2004, Growth opportunities in 2000 for the CLSA 
and S&P samples, and in 2004 for the ISS sample, Size in 2000 for the CLSA and S&P samples and in 2004 for the ISS sample, CLSA governance* 
Predation in 2000, S&P transparency * Predation in 2000, ISS governance * Predation in 2004, GDP per capita in 2000 for the CLSA and S&P samples 
and in 2004 for the ISS sample, Financial development in 2000 for the CLSA and S&P samples and in 2004 for the ISS sample. The instrumented 
variables are ∆CLSA governance, ∆S&P transparency, ∆ISS governance,  ∆Growth opportunities, ∆Size, ∆GDP per capita, and ∆Financial development. 
The numbers in parentheses are probability levels at which the null hypothesis of zero coefficient can be rejected. The coefficients significant at the 10% 
level (based on a two-tailed test) or higher are in bold face. The S&P transparency is either for 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, or 2001. The ISS governance is for 
December 2005. WBES variables are for 2000. All of the variables are defined in Appendixes A, B, C, and D and Table I. 
 
Panel A.1 
Dependent variable  
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆CLSA 
governance 
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆S&P 
transparency 
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ISS 
governance 
∆Growth opportunities  65.915  0.033  0.388 
  (0.07)  (0.20)  (0.01) 
∆Size  -101.553  -82.398  0.140 
  (0.88)  (0.43)  (0.02) 
∆Cash  -16.390  -0.239  -0.987 
  (0.75)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
∆Growth opportunities ∗ Predation  65.915  -0.016  -0.283 
  (0.70)  (0.08)  (0.10) 
∆Size ∗ Predation  -0.079  -2.123  -4.480 
  (0.08)  (0.04)  (0.00) 
∆GDP per capita  -34.507  -32.234  2.218 
  (0.30)  (0.23)  (0.80) 
∆Financial development  13.442  10.834  3.239 
  (0.27)  (0.18)  (0.10) 
Number of observations  304  700  4,988 
F-test of joint significance  66.010  22.130  34.230 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   80 
 
Panel A.2 
 Dependent variable  ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆Valuation 
∆CLSA governance  0.109  -  - 
  (0.04)       
∆S&P transparency  -  0.288  - 
     (0.25)    
∆ISS governance  -  -  4.414 
        (0.05) 
∆CLSA governance * Predation  -0.005  -  - 
  (0.05)       
∆S&P transparency * Predation  -  -0.008  - 
     (0.10)    
∆ISS governance * Predation  -  -  -0.238 
        (0.12) 
∆Growth opportunities  -0.011  0.021  0.342 
  (0.13)  (0.10)  (0.49) 
∆Size  -0.945  -25.814  -0.823 
  (0.00)  (0.51)  (0.00) 
∆GDP per capita  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.14)  (0.30)  (0.12) 
∆Financial development  -0.002  0.233  0.424 
  (0.35)  (0.05)  (0.10) 
Number of observations  308  666  4,314 
F-test of joint significance  6.630  52.150  15.320 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   81 
Appendix A: CLSA governance scores 
 
The CLSA corporate governance scores are based on how analysts rate a company on 51 elements in 6 aspects of corporate governance. The annual data cover 606 firms from 25 
countries from 2000 through 2001.  
 
Discipline  Transparency  Independence  Accountability  Responsibility  Fairness 
 
1. Explicit public statement 
placing a priority on 
corporate governance. 
 
1. Disclosure of financial 
targets, for example, three- 
and five-year ROA/ROE. 
 
1 Board and senior 
management treatment of 
shareholders 
 
1. Board plays a 
supervisory rather than 
executive role. 
 
1. Acting effectively 
against individuals who 
have transgressed. 
 
1. Majority shareholders 
treatment of minority 
shareholders. 
 
2. Management incentives 
toward a higher share 
price. 
 
2. Timely release of 
Annual Reports. 
 








2. Record on taking 
measures in cases of 
mismanagement. 
 
2. All equity holders have 
the right to call general 
meetings. 
 
3. Sticking to clearly 
defined core business. 
 




3. Executive management 
committee comprised 




comprising at least half of 
the board.  
 
3. Measures to protect 
minority interests. 
 
3. Voting methods easily 
accessible (for example, 
through proxy voting). 
 
4. Having an appropriate 
estimate of the cost of 
equity. 
 
4. Timely release of 
quarterly results. 
 
4. Audit committee chaired 
by the independent 
director. 
 
4. Foreign nationals on the 
board. 
 
4. Mechanisms to allow 




4. Quality of information 
provided for general 
meetings. 
 
5. Having an appropriate 
estimate of the cost of 
capital. 
 
5. Prompt disclosure of 
results with no leakage 
ahead of announcement. 
 
5. Remuneration 
committee chaired by 
independent director. 
 
5. Full board meeting at 
least every quarter. 
 
5. Share trading by board 
members fair and fully 
transparent. 
 




6. Conservatism in the 
issuance of equity or 
dilutive instruments. 
 
6. Clear and informative 
results disclosure. 
 
6. Nominating committee 
chaired by independent 
director. 
 
6. Board members able to 
exercise effective scrutiny. 
 
6. Board small enough to 
be efficient and effective. 
 
6. Issuance of ADRs or 
placement of shares fair to 
all shareholders. 
 
7. Ensuring debt is 
manageable, used only for 
projects with adequate 
returns. 
 
7. Accounts presented 
according to IGAAP. 
 
7. External auditors 
unrelated to the company. 
 
7. Audit committee that 
nominates and reviews 
work of external auditors. 
 
 
7. Controlling shareholder 
group owning less than 
40% of the company. 
 
8. Returning excess cash 
to shareholders. 
 




8. No bank representatives 
or other large creditors on 
the board. 
 
8. Audit committee that 





8. Portfolio investors 
owning at least 20% of the 
voting shares. 
 
9. Discussion in the annual 
report on corporate 
governance. 
 
9. Accessibility of investors 
to senior management. 
     
 




10. Website where 
announcements are 
updated promptly. 
     
 
10. Total board 
remuneration rising no 
faster than net profit. 
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Appendix B: S&P transparency rankings 
 
S&P rankings are based on transparency and disclosure, which are evaluated by searching for the inclusion of 91 disclosure attributes in the company’s annual reports. The annual data cover 1,494 firms from 40 
countries during 1997 through 2002.  
 
Ownership structure and investor relations  Financial transparency and information disclosure  Board and management structure and process 
Does the company disclose the:  Does the company disclose:  Does the company disclose: 
1. number of issued and outstanding ordinary shares? Par value of 
each ordinary share?  1. its accounting policy?  1. a list of board members (names)? 
2. top 1 shareholder?  2. the accounting standards it uses for its accounts?  2. details about the directors (other than name/title)? 
3. top 3 shareholders? 
3. the accounts according to an internationally recognized accounting 
standard (IAS/US GAAP)? 
3. details about the current employment/position of the directors 
provided? 
4. top 5 shareholders? 
4. its balance sheet according to international accounting standards 
(IAS/US GAAP)?  4. details about previous employment/positions provided? 
5. top 10 shareholders? 
5. its income statement according to international accounting 
standards (IAS/US GAAP)?  5. when each of the directors joined the board? 
6. description of share classes provided? 
6. its cash flow statement according to international accounting 
standards (IAS/US GAAP)?  6. classification of the directors as an executive or an outside director? 
7. review of shareholders by type?   7. a basic earnings forecast of any kind?  7. a chairman's name? 
8. number and identity of shareholders holding more than 3%?  8. a detailed earnings forecast?  8. details about the chairman (other than name/title)? 
9. number and identity of shareholders holding more than 5%?  9. financial information on a quarterly basis?  9. details about the role of the board of directors at the company? 
10. number and identity of shareholders holding more than 10%?  10. a segment analysis (broken down by business line)?  10. a list of matters reserved for the board? 
11. percentage of cross-ownership?  11. the name of its auditing firm?  11. a list of board committees? 
12. existence of a Corporate Governance Charter or Code of Best 
Practice?  12. a reproduction of the auditors' report?  12. the existence of an audit committee? 
13. Corporate Governance Charter / Code of Best Practice itself?  13. how much it pays in audit fees to the auditor?  13. the names on the audit committee? 
14. details about its Articles of Association? (e.g., changes)  14. any non-audit fees paid to auditor?  14. the existence of a remuneration/compensation committee? 
15. voting rights for each voting or non-voting share?  15. consolidated financial statements (or only the parent/holding co)?  15. the names on the remuneration/compensation committee? 
16. way that shareholders nominate directors to the board?  16. the methods of asset valuation?  16. the existence of a nomination committee? 
17. way shareholders convene an Electoral General Meeting?  17. information on the method of fixed assets depreciation?  17. the names on the nomination committee? 
18. procedure for putting inquiry rights to the board?  18. a list of affiliates in which it holds a minority stake? 
18. the existence of other internal audit functions besides the Audit 
Committee? 
19. procedure for putting forth proposals at shareholders meetings? 
19. a reconciliation of its domestic accounting standards to IAS/US 
GAAP?  19. the existence of a strategy/investment/finance committee? 
20. review of the last shareholders meeting? (e.g., minutes)  20. the ownership structure of its affiliates?  20. the number of shares in the company held by the directors? 
21. calendar of the important shareholders dates?  21. the details of the kind of business it is in?  21. a review of the last board meeting? (e.g., minutes) 
  22. the details of the products or services produced/provided?  22. whether the board provides director training? 
  23. the output in physical terms? (number of users, etc.)  23. the decision-making process of the directors' pay? 
  24. the characteristics of assets employed?  24. the specifics of the directors' pay? (e.g., the salary levels, etc.) 
  25. the efficiency indicators? (ROA,  ROE,  etc.)  25. the form of the directors' salaries? (e.g., cash, shares, etc.) 
  26. any industry-specific ratios?  26. the specifics on the performance-related pay for directors? 
  27. a discussion of corporate strategy?  27. the decision-making of the managers' (not board) pay? 
  28. any plans for investment in the coming year(s)? 
28. the specifics of the managers' (not on board) pay? (e.g., salary 
levels, etc.) 
 
29. the detailed information about investment plans in the coming 
year(s)?  29. the form of the managers’ (not on the board) pay? 
  30. an output forecast of any kind?  30. the specifics on the performance-related pay for the managers? 
  31. an overview of trends in its industry?   31. the list of the senior managers (not on the board of directors)? 
  32. its market share for any or all of its businesses?   32. the backgrounds of the senior managers? 
  33. a list/register of related-party transactions?  33. the details of the CEO's contract? 
    34. the number of shares held by the senior managers? 
 
  35. the number of shares held in other affiliated companies by the 
managers?   83 
Appendix C: Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) governance 
 
The ISS governance index includes 44 governance attributes in 4 sub-categories. The annual data cover 7,530 firms from 23 countries (5,296 firms from 
the U.S.) from 2003 through 2006.   
 
Board  Audit  Anti-takeover  Compensation and ownership 
 
1. All directors attended 75% of the board 
meetings or had a valid excuse. 
1. Consulting fees paid to the auditors are less 
than audit fees paid to the auditors.  
 
1. Single class, common shares only. 
 
1. Directors are subject to stock ownership 
requirements. 
2. CEO serves on the boards of two or fewer 
public companies. 
2. Audit committee comprised solely of 
independent outsiders. 
 
2. Majority vote requirement to approve 
mergers (not supermajority). 
 
2. Executives are subject to stock ownership 
guidelines. 
3. Board is controlled by more than 50% 
independent outside directors 
3. Auditors ratified at the most recent annual 
meeting. 
 
3. Shareholder may call special meetings. 
 
3. No interlocks among compensation 
committee members. 
 
4. Board size is greater than 5 but less than 16.   
 
4. Shareholder may act by written consent. 
 
4. Directors receive all or a portion of their fees 
in stock. 
5. CEO is not listed as having a related-party 
transaction.   
 
5. Company either has no poison pill or a pill 
that was shareholder approved. 
 
5. All stock-incentive plans adopted with 
shareholder approval. 
6. No former CEO on the board.   
 
6. Company is not authorized to issue blank-
check preferred. 
 
6. Options grants align with company 
performance and reasonable burn rate. 
 
7. Compensation committee comprised solely 
of independent outsiders.   
   
7. Company expenses stock options. 
 
8. Chairman and CEO are separate or there is 
a lead director. 
     
8. All directors with more than one year of 
service own stock. 
9. Nominating committee comprised solely of 
independent outsiders. 
     
9. Officers’ and directors’ stock ownership is at 
least 1% but not over 30% of the total shares 
outstanding. 
 
10. Governance committee exists and met in 
the past year. 
     
10. Re-pricing is prohibited. 
 
11. Shareholders vote on directors selected to 
fill vacancies. 
     
 
12. Governance guidelines are publicly 
disclosed. 
     
 
13. Annually elected board (no staggered 
board). 
     
 
14. Policy exists on outside directorships (four 
or fewer boards is the limit). 
     
 
15. Shareholders have cumulative voting 
rights. 
     
 
16. Shareholder approval is required to 
increase/decrease board size. 
     
 
17. Majority vote requirement to amend 
charter/bylaws (not supermajority). 
     
 
18. Board has the express authority to hire its 
own advisors. 
     
 
19. Performance of the board is reviewed 
regularly. 
     
 
20. Board approved succession plan in place 
for the CEO. 
     
 
21. Outside directors meet without CEO and 
disclose number of times met. 
     
 
22. Directors are required to submit resignation 
upon a change in their job. 
     
 
23. Board cannot amend bylaws without 
shareholder approval or can only do so under 
limited circumstances. 
     
 
24. Does not ignore shareholder proposals. 
     
 
25. Qualifies for proxy contest defenses 
combination points. 
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Appendix D: WBES obstacles sample 
 
The data cover 10,032 firms from 81 countries based on the 1999 and 2002 World Bank’s surveys. We identify 6 items relevant for the study. 
 
Corruption obstacle  Taxes and regulation 
obstacle 
Crime obstacle   Availability of laws and 
regulation 
Predictability of laws and 
regulations 
Confidence in judicial 
system today 
 
This variable is based on 
the survey question: 
“Please judge on a four-
point scale, where "4" 
means a major obstacle, 
"3" means a moderate 
obstacle, "2" means a 
minor obstacle, and "1" 
means it is no obstacle, 
how problematic corruption 
is for the operation and 
growth of your business?” 
 
This  variable  is  based  on 
the  survey  question: 
“Please  judge  on  a  four-
point  scale,  where  "4" 
means  a  major  obstacle, 
"3"  means  a  moderate 
obstacle,  "2"  means  a 
minor  obstacle,  and  "1" 
means  it  is  no  obstacle, 
how problematic taxes and 
regulation  are  for  the 
operation  and  growth  of 
your business?” 
 
This  variable  is  based  on 
the  survey  question: 
“Please  judge  on  a  four-
point  scale,  where  "4" 
means  a  major  obstacle, 
"3"  means  a  moderate 
obstacle,  "2"  means  a 
minor  obstacle,  and  "1" 
means  it  is  no  obstacle, 
how problematic organized 
crime and mafia are for the 
operation  and  growth  of 
your business?”   
 
This  variable  is  based  on 
the  survey  question:  "In 
general,  information  on  the 
laws  and  regulations 
affecting my firm is easy to 
obtain" (1. Fully disagree; 2. 
Disagree  in most cases;  3. 
Tend to disagree; 4. Tend to 
agree;  5.  Agree  in  most 
cases; and 6. Fully agree).  
 
This  variable  is  based  on 
the  survey  question:  "In 
general,  interpretations  of 
laws  and  regulations 
affecting  my  firm  are 
consistent  and  predictable" 
(1.  Fully  disagree;  2. 
Disagree  in  most  cases;  3. 
Tend to disagree; 4. Tend to 
agree;  5.  Agree  in  most 
cases; and 6. Fully agree). 
 
This variable is based on 
the survey question: “In 
resolving business disputes, 
do you believe in your 
country's court system?” (1. 
Never; 2. Seldom; 3. 
Sometimes; 4. Frequently; 
5. Usually; and 6. Always).  
 
 
 
 